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CHAPTER 1» 
lîJTERTEOTIOH
Iran9 oommonly known aa tho "gateway to Indla^" Ilea
• _ between India and East Asia on one hand and the Hear East
and the Western World on the other« It is a small stateA A
of 6289O6O square miles and of approximately 15,000,(X)0 
people# Compared to modem progressive states of Europe 
and North America» it is socially and eccviomically back­
ward# But it has the richest oil field in existence and 
is the fourth largest oil producing country in the world.
Because Iran has this abundance of oil, it has become 
with the advent of the mechanical age a focal p&int of
f *the policies of two interested great powers, Russia (now 
the Soviet Union) and Great Britain# But oil alone did 
not bring these two powers into Iran. Since the rise of 
Muscovite Russia, the Russian statd has tried to obtain 
an outlet on an open sea, and the Russian advance to the 
south had as its objective the Persian Gulf# Commercial 
and economic interests along with military interests brought 
the Russian to Iran, or as it was then known, Persia#
The Russian advance to the south also followed the policy 
of empire-building or natural esqjansion which brought the 
Russians into conflict with another empire-building people.
^  ^
tho British#
Tho British esmo to Persia first as a maritime power 
io the poasessloa of a £̂ reat Indiam empire, tho protection 
of which vas a paramount British interest# It was the 
necessity to defend India from any power that might gain 
control of tho weak Persian state that attracted Britain** 
attention to tho Persian area# And in the course of their 
own imperial expansion, the British were not unaware of
i
tho possibility of exploiting Persia and developing there 
a British sphere of interest# A sharply contrasted rivalry 
between Russia and Great Britain developed in the nineteenth 
century in econtxnic, commercial and political affairs# Their 
imperial interests collided in many places in Europe and 
Asia, and their rivalty in Persia was an integral part 
of the ccxiflict#
with the dawn of a new century, however, the European 
and world situation had so altered that in 1907 a great, 
change oocured in the relations of Russia and Great Britain 
over Persia.
One of the more important reasons for Russia** 
acquiescence to a rapprochement with Great Britain was the 
end of the League of Three Emperors (Russia, Germany, and 
Austria) in 1887 because of the Austro-Russian split over 
the Balkans and Germany** support of Austria in this area.
The alliance between Germany and Russia continued for three
** 3
more years, tut the unreliable character of the alliance 
forced Alexander III to seek other allies* This prepared 
the ground for a Franoo-̂ Husslan imderstending which even­
tually ̂ suited In the Franco-Russlan alliance of 1895»
And after Russians defeat in the Japanese war and the result­
ing weakening of Russia** military prestige In the East, 
Ruaso-Brltish relations took on a more favorable character* 
Great Britain, at the same time, also had Important 
reasons for desiring a rapprochement with Russia* With 
the growth of German power in the Near East Great Britain 
came to fear Germany more than It did Russia* Finding 
Itself al«3e and without friends In the Boer War, because 
of a policy of "Splendid Isolation,* Great Britain in 1902 
signed a treaty of alliance with Japan* In 1905 it entered 
into the Entente Cordiale with France and then sought 
friendship with France’s ally, Russia*
Such being the state of affairs, the two powers reached 
an accord known as the Anglo^Ruasion, or the Grey-Iswolsky, 
agreement oh August 31, 1907# The agreement, signed in
Id W# Henry Cooke and Edith P* Stickney, Read in rs in 
European International Relations Since IG79. Harper and 
Brothers, New York, 1931, pp* 12&.130.
See appendix, p&ge iSJfor complete text of treaty*
^ 4 *
St, f*t@r8bur& 'tj the Brltlfih ambassador. Sir Arthur 
Rloolson, and the Russian minister of foreign affairs* 
Alexander Iswolsky, was composed of tliree sections relating 
to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet.
With reference to Persia, both Great Britain and 
Russia promised to respect the Integrity and independence 
of Persia# Trade opportunities would be equal for all 
nations# After the statement of these two principles for 
the sake of appearances. Great Britain and Russia divided 
Persia into three zonest the northern portion to be under 
Russian influence, the southern portion to be in the British 
os^ere of r,Influence, and a  neutral zone to be in the center 
between the two spheres of Influence# The agreement also 
dealt with the Russian Discount and Loan Bank and the 
British Imperial Bank and set the policies they should follow
Generally speaking, this agreement was accepted in 
Europe as of being of great Inportance, because It sub-# 
stltuted friendly relations for better rivalry between the 
two great Asiatic powers. However, according to the Russian
2# Alexander P# lewolsky, (1856-1919) entered the foreign 
office under Prince Gorchakov, and was appointed successively 
to diplomatic posts at Bucharest, Washington, the Vatican, 
Belegrade, Munich, Tokyo and Copenhagen, He was appointed 
minister for foreign affaire In 1906, and In 1910 was made 
Russian ambassador to Paris#
3# Sir Arthur Hloolson, (1849-1928) was a diplomatic ambassad 
to Madrid, 1904-06, and In St. Petersburg, 1906-10# Ke con­
cluded negotiations leading to ihe Algegiras conference in 
1906, and the entente with France and Russia In 1907*
* 5
4
minister of finance. Count Witte, the older Russian 
statesmen were not hapjpy about the eg-reement:
The agreement was a triumph of British 
diplomacy# It dealt chiefly with Persia# The 
Northern part of that country, which Includes 
Its most fertile and thickly populated sections, 
had from times Immemorial been within our sphere 
of Influence# With the conquest of the Southern 
parts of the Caucasus, formerly provinces of 
Persia and Turkey, the Northern part of Persia 
was naturally destined,-so to speak, to become 
& part of the Russian Empire# To prepare that 
eventuality wer sacrificed a great deal of our 
blood and treasure# The agreement set all these 
sacrifices at naught# according to It̂  Southern 
Persia was to be under the eooncmlo influence of 
Great Britain, while the North was left to us#
As for Persia 8 oontral Government, It was to 
be owatrolled.by Russia and Great Britain acting 
jointly# Since Tehran, the eeat of the Central 
Government, is situated In the North this meant 
British influence In the North as well aa in the South#5
The British seemed well satisfied with the agreement, 
because Great Britain was unprepared to maintain Its position 
in Persia by either $oney or force, and the terras secured 
were In all probability as good as could be obtained* Since 
the agreement was made purely between Russia and Great 
Britain and ostensibly to arrange questions concerning 
their respective înterests,** Persia had nothing to do with 
It, either directly or In any manner*
4# Count Sergius Vittc, (1849-̂ 1915) became minister of 
way a of communication In 1892, and August the same year 
became minister of finance# In I&96 he became sec­
retary of state, and In I899 was actual privy councillor#
Ré was responsible for the Portsmouth treaty in 1905#
5# Count Witte, The Memoiaa of tfounÿ Witte# (Translated from 
the original Russian manuscript and edited by Abraham 
lamollnaky). Garden City, N#Y.% Doubleday end Page, 1925, p.
5
While the Russian* and the British promised faith­
fully to "respeot the integrity and Independence of Persia,**
j »
this was not the case# The period between 1907 and World 
War I, in so far as Persia was concerned, was a period of 
continuous intervention on the part of both the British 
and the Russians* ÏXirlng World War I, Persia declared its 
neutrality, but was too weak to prevent Russian, British, 
and Turkish armies from violating its territory*
For all practical purposes, the treaty of 19OT lapsed 
ten years later, in 191?» when the Bolsheviki came to 
power in Russia and upset the former balance of interests 
in Persia* Great Britain poured troops into Persia, and 
its officiels became virtual controllers of the country* 
British policy then centered around a new Anglo-Perslan 
agreement in which Great Britain practically took the govern­
ment of the Shah under its protection end established a 
British protectorate in fact if not in name* But this 
agreement came to naught when the Bolshevist landing at
Enzeli in August 1919 undermined Persian confidence in6
British capacity to defend Persian interests*
Because Bolshevik doctrines were contrary to the 
traditions and the religion Of Persia, the attitude of the
6* K*X. McCarthy, Anrlo-Russian Rivalry In Persia. The 
Univeraity of Buffalo Studies, Vol* XV*, June 1925, Pub­
lished under the direction of the committee of publications, 
of the Boswell Park Publication Fund, p* 64,
7 t
Persian government toward Bolshevism was hostile* However#
7,Bolshevik policy aa stated by Georshy Chloherln (Soviet
foreign minister) In in appeal to the workers and peaaanta
of Persia va» warmly received* He denounced the Anglo-
Persian agreement and gave the Soviet Cnloa’a pledge that
#11 the Taarist treaties whion had "enslaved*̂  Persia wer§
null and void* The Persian government was fully avare of
the danger that Bolshevism presented » but It nevertheless
wished to maintain good relations with Soviet authorities
In order to play them off against the British* Aa a result
of Soviet policy andoof Persian aspirations^ a treaty of
friendship was signed ZWtween the two oouotries at l̂ oecov
ca February 26# "1921# and ratifications were exchanged at
GTehran m  February 26# 1922*
In this treaty of 1921# the ^vlet government statedî
«♦.deairing that the Persian people should be 
happy aad Independent and should be able to 
dispose freely of its patrimony# the Russian 
Republic declares the whole body of treaties and 
conventions concluded with Persia by the Tsarist 
Government# which crushed the rights of the 
Persian people# to be null and void*?
7* Georghy 7# ChicherIn# (1872-1936) was appointed peoples 
cocamlBsar for foreign affairs la &larcb 1918. In 1922 he 
headed the Soviet delegation to the conference at Genoa*
He conducted Soviet policy froq) 1918-30, having a longer 
tenure of office than any contemporary European foreign 
minister*
8* Compilation of Documents, prepared by the representative 
of Iran# for the convenient reference in the Consideration 
by the Security Council of the disputes between Iran and 
the bnlon of Soviet Socialist Republics# pp. 21-27. Dee 
appendix# page try for ooaplete text of treaty*
9* jCb Id * * P* 21*
- 8
To this end* all loan# tO Persia were cancelled, and the 
property of the Bank of Persia was traasfejprad to Persia#
The Persian:eovM/v/Wffvt on It# part promised not to hand over 
to any third state or it# citizens the concessions surren-» 
dared Vj the Soviets# If a third party interfered la the 
internal affairs of Persia, the Soviet# also reserved the 
rî ht to intervene in Persian internal affairs# This treaty
I»
was to become an important factor in the events to follow 
thirty years later#
10
Again in 1927 the Soviet Union and Iran felt the need 11for a treaty# This treaty was one of eacoifity and neutrality 
and in part restated the obligations of the 19^ treaty#
The Soviet Union promised not to interfere in Persian 
affairs unless a third party threatened Persian integrity,
r
and the two ccmtracting parties foreswore aggressive acts 
against the other# All issues between the two powers were to 
be settled peacefully# The treaty was to last for three 
years, to be renewed every year thereafter unless one of 
the parties gave notice of its denunciation#
XI
During the years that followed the signing of the 
^curlty and neutrality treaty, Iran’s foreign relation#
10# In 1935, Hisa Shah changed the official name of Persia 
to Iran#
11# Coaoilation of Document#, prepared by the representative 
of Iran, pp# 16-18#
-  9 -
wei*# faors or le«a uneventful. The Soviet Union was enea6®<l
In reconBtruotlon, Genaany had lost her position aa a Ê r̂ at
power, and Hazlsî  vas not yet taken seriously. However,
Iran did become involved in a dispute with Great Britain
la 1930 over the coneeoslon of the ̂ nslo^Persian Oil Company*
a oonoesslon that had been acquired in 1914 with the assistance12
Of Winston Churohlll. pie Iranian government threatened
nationalization unless it received greater roysllties fraa
the Oil Company. Iran wOa its case and the ooncesaion was
13renewed under conditions very favorable for Iran. In 1919,
Iran became a member,of the League of Nations, and in 1937
it was elected a non-permanent member of the League CoupeH.
In 1941, however, Iran became involved in World,War II, 
because the Allies could not tolerate things the way they, 
we e in Iran. Since the Iranian oil fields were so impor* 
tant for the British fleet, the pro-Nazi Shah could not be 
left on the throne. The country also had a strong German 
Tfifth oolican,** and the government did very little to dis­
courage it. Because it needed Iran for a base to receive 
supplies from its allies, the Soviet Union declared that 
the presence of so many German agents threatened the exle-
12# Winston 3. Churchill, (1874- J had an army background 
and became an %,?* in 1900. He was first lord of the
admirality and minister for national defence. He has been
leader of the conservative party since Hay 1945.
13# United Nations Hews. Vol. I., 5., May 1946, Woodrow
Wilson Foundation, ^#1., p. 3*
- !S-
tenc«)W Ita "life line," Therefore, In Au^uai, 1941, the•1'Ï f- KnulsEocauple<3. the-nort^ra provinces, and the Brltlsli 
oocupld<i\thè Bouthem recio»* The Shah vae deposed, and 
hlfl Boht. îîûhssraed Rlza Pahlevl, vaa placed on the throne* 
Irah>dld not beooae ft bettle field, aa In World War I,
* i " 'N "nor wae; It expected to Join in the military actions of the
’ivar* It/̂ aa, however, obllsod to co-operate fnXly with the
I *Ailles In every other way. In order to ^Ivo full scope 
to this Co-oporation. In September, 1943, Iran declared war 
on dormanyj ' Ae a consequence, all Germans who had not
Isucceeded In leaving the countiy were arrested and taken 
either to Russia or touBrltlah India. On 2îarch 2, 1945, 
Iran declared war can Japan.
To confirm and to define the new situation, a "Tri­
partite Treaty of Alliance" was concluded In Tehran on
January 29, 1942 among the United Klngdcxs, the Soviet Union 
15and Iran. In this agreement, unlike the 1907 agreement, 
iran was accepted on an equal footing with the other con- 
traoting parties. Again as in the 1907 agreement. Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union undertook to "respect the
14. nohaanad Rlza Pahlevl, (1919- ) was "vallalld"(Crown Prince)̂  heir apparent tc the throne.of Iran..
He succeeded to the throne on the abdication of his 
father in 1941.
,15# Security Counc11 Official Records. First Year, First 
Series, Supplement Ho. 1., J.iurdh House, Westminster,
London, pp. 43-45. See Appendix, page 162 for complete 
text of Treaty,
-11
territorial laterrltŷ  the sovereignty and polltloal+jjadepen'
15<3ence of Iran." The Iranian government agreed to place
transport and oommunloatlon faollltlee at the disposal of
the Allied ÿovere. It vas also specifically provided that
"the assistance of the Iranian forces shall# however# he
limited to the maintenance of Internal security of Iranian 
17territory# The Allied powers could maintain armed forces
on Iranian territory# and these forces end Iranian author-
Itiea were to co-operate In settling their difficulties.
An Important part of the treaty (later to come before
the United Nations Security Council) was Article 5» which
required the forces of the Allied powers to be withdrawn
from Iranian territory not later than "six months after
the cessation of hostilities" between the Allied powers
18
and Germany and its associates* The Allied powers were to 
consult with the Iranian government on all matters that 
pertained directly to Iran# and they were to safeguard the 
economic Existence of the Iranian people against the pri­
vations and difficulties brought on by the war*
The same spirit was to be found In the text of the 
thfee-power declaration concerning Iran# made at the Tehran
16* Ibid.. p. A4. 
17# XbId. « P# A4*
18. p. 45.
-  12 *
19
conference, Deoenber 1, 1993# la this declaration the 
epeolal economic difficulties that the war had caused for 
Iran were recocnlsed, and the 2I5 Three (U.S.A., U.S.S.R.* 
and Great Britain) promised to Give Iran all the economic 
assistance they could In ll^ht of the heavy demanda made 
on them by the war* The pledge to guarantee the Independence, 
sovereignty end territorial Integrity of Iran In accordance 
with the principles of the Atlantic Charter was reste ted*
111
These expressions of non-intervention and good will
were not carried out In practice, however, and the occupation
caused unrest among the ooamon people of Iran* Following
the occupation, a bad harvest, sad the oocup^ng trocps,
especially the Russians who took over the available supply
20of food. Caused a famine* In addition, the Iranians had 
to contend with Inflation and the disruption of transportation 
resulting from the presence of forelgi troops* To complicate 
the situation. In October and November, 1944, the Soviets 
demanded oil concessions In Iran* The Soviets had been pros­
pecting for oil before the war In northern Iran, partlcularily
19. Ibid.. pp. 49-50. See Appendix, page 166 for complete 
text of treaty.
20. William S. Hass, Iron. Columbia University freas, N.Y., 
1946, p. 226.
In ̂ lazanderan, and after the occupation had begun, they21began to drill in the occupied zone. At the same time, 
American and British oil concerns were also demanding that 
the Iranian government give them oil concessions* On Nov­
ember 2, 1944  ̂however, the Iranian government decided not 
to give any new oil concessions after the war. Four reasons 
were given for doing this;
First, the Iranien public poinion would 
consider any concession as having been granted' 
under duress as long as foreign troops were in 
Iran; second, the economic condition of the world 
was not clear; third, the Washington oil conference had left the situation in doubt; and fourth, all 
reports froa Iranian representatives abroad had 
urged that no concessions be granted during theoccupâtion*22
Criticizing the Iranian government for its refusal to 
grant the oil concession, the Soviet Union alleged that thé 
Iranian government favored the United States and Great
23Britain, The Soviet government also questioned the presence 
of United States troops in Iran, since the United States 
had not been a party to the tri-part it e agreement. This 
in spite of the fact that United States troops had been 
stationed In Iran to insure the delivery of goods to the 
Soviet Uhion. With the arrival of these American trobps,
21* Ibid,, p, 238*
?2, New York Tjmes. November 2, 1944*
23# Hass, Ir̂ n, p. 239.
Iran bad become the only place In the world where the 
Big Three had troops In the same country. As early as 
November 1944, Iran was looked upon as a proving ground for 
the United Nations and as a test of Big Three unity In the 
postwar world*.
But Big Three unity and Sovtet-'lranlan relations were 
weakened In November, 1945 when a rebellion occured In the 
province of Azerbaijan, an Iranian province on the Soviet 
border and therefore open to Soviet Influence* Before the 
outbreak of the rebellion, Soviet military and civil auth­
orities in the northern provinces of Iran and particularly
In Azerbaijan, had encouraged and supported turbulent elements
24
In their opposition to the Tehran government, Soviet occupation 
forces now openly hindered Iranian authorities frcaa exercising
i
their legitimate duties* A military occupation was also 
established In the northern provinces contrary to Article 4, 
paragraph 1, of the trl-partlte treaty which stated that 
the presence of Allied forces on Iranian territory should 
not constitute a military occupation. Soviet authorities 
also encouraged an autonomy movement In Azerbaijan, and the 
Iranian government claimed that agents employed by Soviet 
authorities to carry out the autonomy movement and rebellion
24l Security Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Series, Supplement No* 1,, pp* 27-29.
were Soviet citizens of mixed origin who could pass as 
Azerbaijanians.
At the outbreak of the rebellion, the Iranian govern­
ment dispatched reinforcements to Azeib̂ aljan to help the 
small Iranian continent of troops in the northern provinces, 
but these troops were stopped at Shertf-Abad (80 miles from
Tehran) by Soviet army authorities and were not allowed to
25proceed to theIk destination* The Soviet government explained 
that the Iranian troops were halted, because, if they were to 
proceed to Azerbaijan, tĥ re would have been much useless 
rioting and bloodshed.
The consequence of this intervention by Soviet troops 
was to place the rebels,in a position'successfully to intim­
idate the civilian population and the Iranian officials in 
Azerbaijan. All relations with the central govemrAunt were 
severed, and the rebels proclaimed the autonomy of the dis­
tricts under their control* They besieged the army garrisons 
stationed in different towns of Azerbaijan, forced them to 
surrender, and disarmed them. Government offices and rail­
roads were captured, and an illegal government was established 
in Tabriz, capital of Azerbaijan, in defiance of the constitutloi
Of Iran and the central government. A legislative assembly1
was convened to which only official candidates of the rebels 26
were elected.
25. IMi.# p. 29.
26* Ibid.. p* 29.
— —■
The Soviet Union at no time conoealed Its support of 
the Insurgents* Propaganda supporting the Insurgents flowed 
out of the Soviet Union* A Soviet consul attended* In his 
official capacity* the opening session of the Insurgent
I H
aasemhly at Tabriz*
By diplomatic, notes* the Iranian government appealed 
to both the United States and Great Britain to persuadé
• r-
the U,3*8,R* to end its Intervention In Iran* Since the 
United States decided to support Iran*s case* on November
-  2724* 1945 Its ambassador In Moscow* Averell Karrlman* deliv­
ered a note to the Soviet govemment concerning the situation
28
In Iran# In this note* It was stated that the Iranian gov-* 
emment had informed the United States government that an 
armed uprising had taken place In areas of northern Iran 
where, Soviet troops had been stationed and that Iranian 
troops had been stopped on their way to Azerbaijan* Con* 
sequently* the Iranian government could not carry out its 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order on 
Iranian territory* To reprove the U*S#8* ̂  for Its conduct
ft27* William Averell Harrlman* {1891-̂  ) was the présidantesspecial representative and minister to Great Britain, land - 
headed the mission to Moscow In 1941* He was ambassador to the U.S.S.R*, 1943-45*
28# Security Counc11 Official Recorda^ First Year* First 
Series* Supplement, No* 1.* pp. 53-55*
-  17 ^
In thlB Instance, the Tehran declaration vaa included to
remind the Soviet Dnion of its pledges concerning Iran# If
the Soviet authorities vho had stopped the Iranian forces
had acted without instructionŝ  it was expected hj the
United States that the Soviet government would "Issue them
orders In keeping with the Tehran Ifeclaratlon" and that the
29Iranian forces he allowed to pass. In conclusion the nate 
stated)̂
nations such aa Iran were encouraged at the 
United Nations Conference at San Francisco to 
place full trust In the friendly Intentions,and 
good will of the permanent members of the. Security. 
Council# The Government of the United States Is 
confident that the Soviet Union and Great Britain 
are no less anxious than the United States; In 
dealing with nations such as Iran# to follow a 
line of aotlofi which will make It clear that the 
trust of these nations in the permanent members of the Security Council has not been misplaced. 
Similar prooosala are being made to the BritishGovernment #30
3XOn November 27# 1945# Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, 
British ambassador to the U*S.,S.R.# handed Vyacheslav Molotov#32
29# mid#, p.̂ 54.
30. Ibid., P., 55»
31» Archibald Clark Kerr entered the diplomatic service In 1906# and was envoy extraordinary and minister plenlpoten^ 
tlary to the Central toerlcaa Republics, 1925-28: to Chile, 
I928-3O; to Sweden, 1931*"35̂ «. He was ambassador to Baghdad, 
1935-39) to China, 1939̂ 42; to the U.S.S.R» 1942-45; and to the United States 1946-48. he was created Lord Inver- 
chapel in 1946.
. } *
32* Vyacheslav M. Molotov {I890- ) was a member of the
Bolshevik party and served in the commun 1st revolutionary 
government in 1917. Ke has been secretary of the central committee of the communist party since 1921, sndVao 
minister of foreign affairs, 1939-46.
«  JLO —
the Soviet minister for foreign affairs, a #ote that followed
33quite closely the note cent by the United States.
The Soviet government replied to the United States
note on November 291 1945# The note stated that according
to info mat Ion at the disposal of the Soviet government, the
statement made In the United States note concerning the armed
uprising in northern Iran Id Id not correspond to the facts.
These events had not constituted an armed uprising and were
not directed against the Iranian government. On the contrary.
It was evident that this vaa:
matter of aspirations with respect to the 
assurance of the democratic rights of the Azer^ 
baijan population of northern.Iran, which la 
seeking national autonomy within the limite of the Iranian State, and which haeilts own language,
- different from the Persian language,35 1 *
The note also stated that the "undesirable" incidents vhddh
had taken place had been caused by zreactionary elements
who were opposed to the extent ion of national rights to
the population of northern Iran,
Emphatically denying the accusations made in the Soviet
note, the Iranian government declared again that there was
33* Security Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Series, Supplement Ko. 1., pp,
■JA, 2ÈM., PP. 57-58.
35. 2Uâ.. p. 57.
- 19 -
an armed uprising that amounted to rebellion# It denounced
the Azerbaijan "Popular Assembly" as Illegal.
\nille this exchange of notes between the United States
and British governments with the Soviet government had been
proceeding, the Iranian government had sent the Soviet Union
37a number of commijnloatlons protesting Soviet interference.
The communications dated November 17# 22, and 23# and December 1,
1945 are cited as examples,
A not© from the Iranian foreign minister to the Soviet
embassy In Tehran on November 17 cited a number of individual
Instances In which Soviet officials had Interfered with
38Iranian internal affairs In the northern provinces. The
Soviet government was informed that orders had been given1 *
tot the dispatch of the governor-general# governors, and 
other officials to their posts In the northern provinces, 
posts which hitherto had remained vacant because of Soviet 
Interference,̂  Troops were also being sent to re-establish 
order, and the Iranian government requested the Soviet gov­
ernment to allow these officials and troops to proceed to 
their destination,
36; Ibid., p. 36.
37* lÈiâ** PP# 43 and 61, for index to communications,
38. Ibid.j p. 52,
On November 22, a note was sent by the Iranian ministry 
of foreign affairs to the Soviet embassy which Informed the 
embassy that the Iranian troops mentioned in the note of 
November 17# had been stopped on their way to Tabriz from
39Tehran, It was requested that the Soviet government tele­
graph instructions to Soviet military authorities that the 
troops be allowed to ; proceed# Agra in it way emphasized 
thàt only the early arrival of this force could restore 
order in Azerbaijan#
The Iranian government sent the Soviet embassy a 
note on November 23, and the request that telegraphic instruc­
tion should be Issued to the Soviet military authorities
40to let the Iranian troops pass, was urgently renewed* The 
assurances made by the Soviet government In the tri-partite 
treaty and the Tehran declaration were called to its attention 
In replying to these Iranian communications, the Soviet 
embassy on November 26 denied the accusation that Soviet: 4:
authorities were interfering in the internal affairs of Iran# 
After reviewing in detail the charges contained in tho Iranian
39. Ibid*. P. 52#
40#k It id » m p # 53 #
4l. PP* 55-56.
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note of’Kovcm'ber 17» tho Soviet Government declared that no
responsibility vas attached to It for the absence of Governors
or other officials In the northera provinces. With roGard
to the dispatch of'armed forces to Azerbaijan, the reason
given for the holding up of the Iran Ian forces was that '
their arrival In this province would cause disturbances and
bloodshed. The Soviets, could not let this happen.
Since Soviet actions had constituted a breach of Iranian
sovereignty and Independence, the Iranian government countered
that the arguments of the Soviet government were In admis sable.
Therefore on îîovember 26, the Iranian government addressed
a'note to the United States, the'United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union, which stated that disturbances and disorders
had occurred In parts of Azerbaijan and that the central
government had lost touch with Its ̂officials and was unable
to Issue the necessary Instructions to the authorities con—42 <
cemed. The Iranian government stated Its willingness! to
examine any conplaints which did not constitute acts of dis—,
obedience against the central government, but It hoped
that the three governments would recognize the heed of taking
steps a^Inst thé rebel elements. Attention was drawn to
the fact that the question was of the upmost Importance andI *
42; iMd., p; 56.
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urgenoŷ  and Iran aslted that the power concemed (the U*S*8.R.)
Bhould olvo the necessary Instructions to Its authorities
to relieve the situation*
On December 1$ the Iranian government answered the43
Soviet note of November 26 referred to above* It was asserted
that the Iranian government did not wish to give further
explanations concerning the charges of interference of Soviet
officials in the past in the internal affairs of Iran,
Charges which the Soviet Union had said were unfounded*
Hope was expressed that the intervention of Soviet authorities
in the.internal affairs of Iran would cease; in order to
maintain public order and national security, Iranian forces
must have full Jurisdiction over Iranian territory.
.Since it Was unable to secure Soviet oompllm//ce with
its requests, the Iranian government again-.sent a note to
44
the governments of the Big Three, It was noted that: in view 
of the fact that the presence of foreign troops in Iran had 
caused dislocation in all the affairs of the country, it 
was essential that the question of putting an end to the sit­
uation should be discussed at the foreign ministers con­
ference then being held in Koscow*
43. Ibid.. pp* 56-60*
44* Itid.* p. 60*
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45Consequently, et thla conference Ernst Bevln, supported 46
"by James F# By mes, made a proposal that a t r 1-part Ite
commission for Iranian affairs,composed of the representatives
of Great Britain, ĥe United States, and the Soviet Union,
be formed and'Invested with wide powers, According to the
Information Bulletin out out by the U,S,0,R, embassy in
the United States*
The Soviet Government, true to its policy 
of respecting the state Independence of all 
countries, declined the proposal as one violating the sovereignty and national Independence of Iran*
In this case the Soviet Government acted in the 
spirit of the principles of democracy in relations 
between countries and nations big and small, which 
it consistently and steadfastly pursues in all its actions on the international scene,47
Since nothing came out of the foreign ministers con^ 
Terence in. Moscow to help the Iranian government's case, 
on January 19, 1946 Iran submitted the question of inter­
vention in its internal affairs'to the Security Council 
would recommend that the Soviet government cease its inter­
ference in the internal affairs of Iran, and also that It
45, Ernst Bevln, (1881-1951) was a member of the economic advisory council and various labor organizations. He was 
minister of labor and national service, 1940-45, and was 
chairman of the trades union congress in 1957. In 1945 he was made secretary of state for foreign affairs, and 
in 1946 he was a delegate to the United %atipns*
46, James F, Byrnes, (1879— ) was a member of congress,
1911-25,. and. was a senator Ih 1931, Frcaü 1941-42 he wasa associate Justice of the U.S. supreme ooûrt, and in 1943 
was director of economic stabilisation. He was director 
of the office of war mobilisation, 1943-45, and was secretary* of state, 1945-47, In 1946 he was a delegate to the United 
Nations,
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would order Its military and civil authorities in Iran to 
permit Iranian forces and officials to carry out their 
functions of maintaining law and order.
IT
Iran has become over the centuries an area of cchi- 
troversy for several great powers. The two powers mostly 
Involved in furthering their policies at Persian (or Iranian) 
expense have been Russia (the Soviet Union) and Great. Britain* 
But at times other powers have shown interest in the internal 
affairs of Iran, as evidenced by Germany before the two 
world wars and the United States In World War II# Whereas 
Imperial Russia and Great Britain were able to reach an 
agreement over their respective interests in Iran, the Soviet 
Union and Great Britain* except during World War II* have 
been unable to do so. This divergence of views between 
the Soviet Union and Great Britain has helped Iran to main­
tain Its sovereignty and Independence. When the two great 
powers were able to compromise their views, Iran lost its 
sovereignty and Independence and could do nothing about it. 
This intervention by great powers has had a profound effect 
«ru Iranian foreign policy and has resulted In the playing
47# Information Bulletin.̂  Embassy of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. Vol. VI., No. 44., Washington B.C.* îlay 11* 1946, p. 378.
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off by Iran of one great power against the other* In thla 
way only has It been able to keep some semblance of sov­
ereignty end independence.
When an International organization was created after 
World War I» Iran, to settle Its difficulties with the 
British over the Anglo-Iranlan Oil Company and with the 
new Russian Republic, referred the disputes to the League 
of dations. The League proved a help to Iran In Its negoti­
ations with Its powerful neighbors, even though the solution 
of the disputes was found outside the League. Iran pro­
fited from League backing, because the League carried enougfc 
prestige to Influence the decisions of the negotiations*
When both Great Britain and the Soviet Union considered 
that the situation In Iran warranted Intervention In World 
War II, Iran’s sovereignty was violated, and It was forced 
to agree to a treaty that gave the Allies almost every- 
rlght they wanted. While the great powers were In agreement, 
Iran had no chance to protect Its Interests, but after the 
war, Iran again was able to play them off against each 
other. After Its unsuccessful appeal to the Soviet Union 
to cease Intervention In Iran’s domestic affatls, Iran 
had to take Its case to the International organization, the 
United Bâtions*
The U.S.S.R. had not lived up to Its commitment a made 
to Iran In the Soviet hour of need* When it was assured of
-  26 ^
victory over Germany, the Soviet Union*a attitude toward 
Iran changed. Its Interference In the internal affairs of 
Iran led to a dispute that was to be the prelude to the 
"cold war* a tension that in turn was to characterize the 
split between the west and east. Fortunately for Iran, there 
was an International organization to which it could present 
Its complaints and hope for a Justifiable settlement.
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CHAPTER 2.
THE BEVIN RESOLUTION
The Iranian question was Introduced to the United
Nations during the second meeting of the Security Council1
in London on January 25, 1946. Sayyid H. Taqizadeh, head2
of the Iranian delegation, earlier had sent a letter on 
January 19, 1946 to Gladwyn Jebb, executive secretary of 
the United Nations, In which he complained of the inter­
ference of Soviet officials and armed forces in Iranian 
internal affairs. At that time, the Iranian government 
claimed that Iran unsuccessfully had tried to negotiate
4
with the Soviet Union under the provisions of Article 33
1. Sayyid H. Taqizadeh was born at Tabriz, Iran. He was 
minister to Great Britain, 1929-30 and minister to France, 1933-54. Again minister to Great Britain, 1941-44, he also became chairman of the Iranian delegation to the Gen­eral Assembly in London, 1946.
2. Security Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Series, No. 1., Church House, Westminster, London, (17 
January 1946 to 16 February 1946), p. 15#
3. Hubert Miles (Gladwyn) Jebb,(1900- ) entered dip­lomatic service in 1924, and was made acting councilor in 
the foreign office, 1941. In 1942 he became head of the 
reconstruction department, and in 1946 he became deputy to 
the assistant under-secretary of state and the United Nations 
advisor.
4. Article 33 of the United Nations Charters **1. The parties 
to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, 
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, med­
iation, conciliation, arbitration. Judicial settlement, re­
store to regional agencies or arrangements or other peace­
ful means of thèir own choice. 2. The Security Council shall, 
when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle 
their dispute by such means.
«V 2 8  "•
of the Charter# How# heoauae of the failure of the attempt
to negotiate# Iran was Bubmltttng the dispute to the Security
5Council under Article 35# paragraph 1.
Prior to the submission of the question to the Security
Council# the Iranian letter had been circulated among the
members of the Council. Therefore# the president# H.J.O,
6
Makln of Australia# felt that there was no need to read It# 
and since there were no comments from.any of the members# 
the question was included on the agenda without delay#
7At the beginning of the discussion# Andrei Ï. Vyshinsky 
(U«S#S#H#) wanted to know whether the Inclusion of the question 
on.the agenda had been for "consideration of the question 
or .discussion as to whether It should come before the Council
5# Article 35, paragraph 1# of the United Nations Chairter; 
"Any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute 
or any situation of the. nature referred to In Article 34# 
to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly#*
*• i •6, Norman J.O. Makln# (1889-̂  ) became speaker of the
house of representative8# 1929‘*31# and was minister for navy and munitions# 1941-46# He was ambassador to the 
U.S.A., representative to the General Assembly# the Security 
Council# and the Trusteeship Council, In 1946 for Australia.
7# Andrei Ï. Vyshinsky, (1893- ) became a member of the
Communist party In 1920, and a commissar for the deputy 
publlo-prosecutor and public prosecutor#. 1935-39. He was Tlce-forelgn,minister In 1946 and was the chairman of the 
U«S.S#E. delegation to the General Assembly and a member 
of the Security Council.
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8
at all?** If It were only Intended to dlscusa whether the 
question should be considered or not, he had no objection 
to Its Inclusion on the agenda* Even so, he was going to 
present to the Council, at the next meeting, reasons why 
the question should not be considered at all*
Because he believed that the Iranian question was 
put before the Oouncll to embarrass the Soviet Union,
Vyshinsky at this time counter-attacked by asking for the
»Inclusion of the Greek question on the agenda to embarrass
the United Kingdom* But, Bevln countered this move by
claiming that he wanted everything "brought out Into the open"
where he could clear up any mlnunderstandings as to Britain’s
9relations with Greece* He also wanted the Iranian delegate
to be given a'chance to state his case at the Council table*
10In agreeing fully with Bevln, Edward R* Stettin lus 
revealed the existence of an Anglo-American bloc that was 
soon to be an antl-Sovlet bloc. Indeed, at the very beginning 
of the discüsalon over Iran; the split between east and west
8; Security Council Official Records* First Year, First 
Series, No# 1*, p* 16*
9e Ibid#, p# IT *■
10. Edward R* Stettlnlus, (1900-1949) was chairman of the 
war resources board, 1939 and lend-lease administrator,̂  
1941-43* He was secretary of state, 1944-45 and chairman 
of the U.S.A* delegation to Dimbarton Oaks, 1944 and UNCIO, 
1945. In 1946 he was representative to the General Assembly and the Security Council*
^ 30
became evident, and It prosresalvfelj worsened as the 
dispute continued* The United States and the United King­
dom representatives from the first to the last of the dis- 
pute remained In complete accord.
After listening to the arguments Just, presented, Abdel 11
Hamid Badawl Pasha, (%Tpt) formally moved to have the
Iranian delegate seated at the Council table. And when
Vyshinsky showed no opposition to the seating of the Iranian
delegate, the Egyptian delegate's resolution was adopted12
without opposition. The Iranian delegate was not seated 
In this meeting, however, because the members got Involved 
In a debate over whether the Council could discuss a case 
after It had been heard, eventually deciding that the Council 
had the competence to decide the treatment to be accorded
13various matters when they came before It. The president 
then adjourned the meeting.
11. Abdel Hamid Badawl Pasha, fl887- ) became legal advisor
to the government, 1922-23, and was chief legal advisor, 
1926-40. He was minister for foreign affairs, 1945^6and was chairman of the Egyptian delegation to the UHGIO,1945. In 1946 he was representative to the General Assembly 
arid the Security Council and a Judge on the International Court of Justice.
12. Security’ Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Series, No. 1., pp. 18-19.
13. Ibid.. pp. 19-20.
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Already it had been decided that each member would 
serve as president for one month, and they would assume the 
office alphabetically, beginning with the Australian rep­
resentative, In this first meeting to hear the Iranian 
question, the pattern for lAter meetings was set* Issues 
would be decided when they arose; no comprehensive plan of 
conduct was to be worked out In advance. Already, too, the 
antl-Sovlet bloc was forming, and the Soviet delegation
from the beginning tried to prove that the Iranian case
?
was false,
II
The Iranian question was taken up again In the third 
meeting of the Security Council on January 28, 1946, After 
inquiring If the Council had any comment on the seating of 
the Iranian delegate, the president observed that the 
Iranian question was the first occasion on which the Security 
Council had been called upon to act under Chapter 6 of the 
Charter (ffaclflo Settlement, of Disputes"), Consequently, 
since the proceedings In this case were likely to serve as 
precedents for the future, the Council should act with care. 
To get under way, the president suggested that the Iranian 
argument be heard first and then the Soviet, At this point, 
Vyshinsky Interrupted to say that the question could beT f 1
discussed only In Its procedural aspect, after which the 
Council accepted the president's proposal and sat back to
hear the Iranian oaae»
Taking omaiderable time to present his case, Taqizadeh
examined the tri-partlte treaty and the Tehran declaration»
explaining in detail the manner vrhich the Soviet Union
had violated its pledges by its recent actions in Iran# The14
Iranian delegate at the same time submitted a memorandum 
in which the particulars of Soviet interference were re­
stated in greater detail* and all the communications between 
Iran* the Soviet Union* the United States* and the United 
Kingdom were noted* His basic argument was that Iran fiad 
tried to negotiate with the Soviet government, but, in spite 
of all that the Iranian government had done* and for reasons 
unknown to the Iranian delegate* the Soviet government had 
refused to work for a settlement* He called attention to 
the Iranian note of December 1* 1945 in which the Iranian 
government had expressed satisfaction with a Soviet note 
that earlier had Implied that interference by Soviet troops 
and authorities would cease# But in this same note* the 
Iranian government also had asked unsuccessfully for a 
Soviet guarantee of freedom of movement for Iranian officials 
and troops in Ihan# In making his accusations* Taqizadeh
4
carefully reminded thl listeners that Iran at all times wanted 
friendly relations with its northern neighbor*.
14* Security Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Series* Supplement 2̂o. 1#* Church House* Westminster*
London* 1946* 25-42#
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VÿBhlnekŷ  In rebutting the Iranian argument̂  for the
moment put aside the question ef aubstqnoe (the actual
situation as it existed in Iran) and dealt only with the
15procedural aspects of theqpestion* Because they did not 
meet the conditions specified in the Charter# thequeationa 
raised by the Iranian delegate could not be discussed# so 
Vyshinsky argued. As he said# there were two main points 
in the procedural aspect i first# whether negotiations had 
taken place; and second# whether results had been achieved 
by negotiations. According to Vyshinsky# the Iranian delegate 
had refuted his own statement that no negotiations had taken 
place by admitting that hot only had the Iranian govern­
ment endeavored,to negotiate with the Soviet government# but 
that tucl> negotiations actually had taken place. It vàs. 
Vyshinsky’A contention that the Iranian government was satis--
t -fled with the results of the neogitatlons of November and 
December# 1945. As proof# he cited the Iranian not© of 
December 1# 1945 alreadymentioned by the Iranian delegate.
Vyshinsky made much of the fact that the U.S.S.R., bad 
the legal right to keep troops in Iran. This legal right 
had been obtained# of course# under the tri^partite treaty 
which gave the Soviet Union six months after the cessation 
of hostilities with Germany to withdraw Its troops. But the 
six month period was not yet ended# since the Soviet IMion
15. Security Council Official Records. First Year# First 
Series# No.l.# p. 59.
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bad aet the terminal date alx months after the end of the
rnar with Japan rather than the war with Germany, as had been
epee if led in the treaty. March 2, was the date given by
the Soviet Union for the withdrawal of its troops*
While trying to conform the articles of Chapter 6 to
his viewpoint, Vyshinsky got into the legality of the question,
As concerned Article 33# bilateral negotiations had been
and were then taking place, and the Council, consequently
could not call on the D.5.S*R. to take the steps provided
16for by the article. He denied that Article 34 was applicable 
to the question, since it related to a dispute or situation 
of quite a different order. Because the Iranian complaint
 ̂ A
needed no such reaommendations as provided for in Article 36,
ITparagraph 1, it too did not fit the case. The only method 
for settling the Iranian question was bilateral negotiations 
between the disputants.
l6* Article 3fP of the United Nations Charter: **The Security Council may Investigate any dispute, or any situation which 
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dis­
pute, in order to determine whether the continuance Of the 
dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.*
IT. Article 36, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charters *The Security Co me 11 may, at any stage of a dispute of 
thé nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of 
like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods 
of adjustment#*
* 35 —
18
VyahlnBÎcy also denied that Article 37, paragraph 1, 
permitted the Iranian chargeŝ  This article envisaged a 
situation In which the parties to a dispute found them­
selves unahle to reach an agreement* But, Vyshinsky averi^d, 
no such situation existed In the relations of the U*S.S*R. 
and Iran, and, consequently, there was no foundation for 
the application of this article to the Iranian complaints* 
Having decided that no part of Chapter 6 applied to the 
Iranian question, Vyshinsky concluded that the Council had 
no legal grounds for considering It,
The members by this time were tired of listening to 
the lengthy exposition by Taqizadeh and to the equally long 
Soviet tirade, and the president thereupon proposed the 
postponement of the discussion until the next meeting,
Vyshinsky arguing the Inexpediency of dividing the dis­
cussion Into %wo parts by a postponement, was Overruled 
by the rest of the Council, and the meeting was adjourned. 
Discussion of the Iranian matter was postponed until January 30,
18, Article 37, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter: 
“Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to In Article 33 fall to jettie it by the means Indicated In 
that Article, they shall refer It to the Security Council,*
19, Security Council Offlolal Records. First Year, First 
Series, No, 1,, p, 44,
36 —
Both parties to the disputa had presented their views 
in this meeting, and, as can lb seen disagreed as to whether 
negotiations had been concluded or not, Vyshinsky presented 
a good argument against keeping the question on the agenda 
with his interpretation of the articles under Chapter. 6,
At the same time, however, the Iranian delegate made a good 
ease out of the trl-partlte treaty, the Tehran deolaratiop, 
and the alleged violations of these Soviet committments by
the Soviets themselves,
;
III
Since the discussion of the Iranian question had been
postponed until January 30, it did not come up again until
the fifth meeting, of the Council, Repeating the request of
the Iranian delegate to make supplementary remards to his
statement of the third meeting, the president proposed
20that Taqizadeh be allowed to spest̂ * Jt should be remembered 
that since the Iranian delegate had no. voice In the pro­
ceedings of the Council, he had to be invited especially 
at each meeting to sit at the Council table#
Having gained,the floor, the IranIan delegate contestedI
the Soviet viewpoint that, since there had been negotiations 
between the two partieŝ  the Iranian compliint, could not be 
brought to the attention of the Council* Facta from the 
Iranian memorandum of the third meeting again were presented
20 Ibid., pp. 45-46,
"* 37 ̂
aa evidence that negotiations between'the U.S.S.R, and Iran 
had failed. Moreover̂  the eagerness of the Iranian govern­
ment to keep on good terms with the U.S.S.R. was demon­
strated when Taqizadeh told how the Iranian prime minister, 21Ahmad Uhavam, had eÿért:offered to go to Moscow In the hope *
of reaching a settlement. But the Soviet government had 
Ignored the offer of direct negotiation in Moscow, No nego­
tiations for the settlement of the dlppute had taken place, 
"This also Included the note of December 1» 1945 mentioned 
earlier).
Taqizadeh was very animated In maintaining that the 
d 1 spute,hhaVIng found a place on the agenda, under "no cir­
cumstances aust It go out of the hands of the Councllj It
must be parsued,* An Iranian proposal for dealing with the
*question was presented I1
The Council should take this m&tter under 
Its jurisdiction; negotiations should proceed . under Its aegis. Progress should be reported"to 
the Council from time to time, and the results should be reported to It with In a reasonable lapse of time. In this way, we are ready toeet 
Into direct negotiations with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, but under no circumstances 
are we prepared to let the matter go out of theCouncil.22
21. Ahmad Ghavam, (1872- ) held various toablnet posts,
1910-23 and In 1946 was appointed premier, minister of Interior, and minister of foreign affairs.
22. Security Council Official Records. First Tear, First 
Series, No. 1,, p. 49.
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After Taqizadeh had finished his retmttal, Vyohtae^ 
for the oeoond tine denounced the Iranian case* He attached 
Thqlzedeh** Bû /plencntary statement that there nad been no 
direct negotiations# There must have been direct negotiations, 
he paid, since there had to be a third person or state to 
hove Indirect nê otlatlona, and there ;.as no third person 
or state In this case# Anjvay, It did not matter whether 
there had been direct or Indirect negotiations, ea lonz 
as there hadfieon negotiations. A sa In commcntlnc on the 
Iranian note of December 1, Tychlna^ asserted t‘r-at the 
Iranian government had teen satisfied with the result of 
the necotlatlone# The Iranian delegate was accused of 
deliberately" confusing the situation, end moreover, the 
Iranians were not to be trusted# Thesa were strong words, 
but the disparity In power between the two disputants made 
It possible for Vyshlnshy to say almost any thinc he wished 
about Iran or Its delegates#
According to Vyshlnshy, the presence of Soviet troops 
In Azei^aljan had nothing to do with the events that had 
occured there# The reunion was en Internal Iranian matter, 
end the people of Azerbaijan were only trying to secure 
their rightful national auton<X3y. Since the movsnoat did 
not constitute anything unusual In any denooratio country, 
there was nothing particularly wrong with It#
23. Ibid#, p. A9#
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Interference with Iranianraoops on their way to
Azerbaijan wae explained by Vyshinsky^ By allowing Iranian
troops to proceed, cniah bloodshed and a "useless massacre"
would have resulted# ond the Soviet troops could not let
that happen, of course# Moreover* the Iron Ian notes following
the note of December 1# were sent only with the hope of
taking advantage of the Moscow conference* Indeed* Vyshinsky
argued# the motive of the notes was toAdvance the idea
that all foreign troops should leave Iran# The Iranian
proposal just made by Taqizadeh was not In keeping with
the Soviet position# Vyshinsky vigorously opposed having
the tJ*S#S#R# placed under some sort of special supervision#
It was incompatible with its dignity as a member of the
Security Council and "aa Incompatible with the dignity
.  24
of the United Nations#**
Taking exception to the Soviet representative's last 
remarks, Taqlradeh replied that he had never admitted that 
there had been negotiations without results as provided for 
In Article 35* paragraph 1, of the Cbajrter#
Before the president opened the matter to general 
discussion, the two divergent arguments can be summed up 
in a few words. The Iranian stand was that no negotiations 
had taken place and that Iran had every right under the 
reVetant articles of the Charter to present Its case to
24* jMl;# p. 53.
the Council and to expect Jud^nent on it# The Soviet
position was that negotiation a had taken place and that
the Iranian government had shown satisfaction over the
negotiations la the December 1 note* Also the Iranian
action in present lag the case to the Council was lllcgol,
in that it did not fulfill the requirements of the articles
under Chapter 6 of the Chapter*
After the president had opened the quectlon to dis*
cusBlon, Devin started the debate by reading Article 4
of the tri-paxtite treaty, which stated that the ocoupatloa
forces would not constlTute a military occupation and that
25internal effairs of Iran would be left alone* Because he 
understood that it was an Iranian donestlo matter, Bevln 
was "a little perturbed** when he heard Vyshinsliy say that 
It,was the Soviet Union that had decided hew many Iranian 
troops and police would be allowed In Azerbaijan. Gratl* 
tude was expressed for the Iranian co-operation received 
in the war. Since the United Kingdom delegate o:uld xandej>« 
stand and respect the tri-part ite treaty, pja could not under­
stand why the Soviets either could or would not under­
stand and respect it. The whold Soviet position looked 
like a "war of, nerves" to Bevin. Because he felt that Iran 
should have the backing of the United Nations in its pre­
dicament and Bhould not be left alone to face the Soviet
25* Oli*. P?. 54-55.
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Cnioa» hia coocXualon vas that the quo at! du should te 
left on the
Stettinlua C3q>re8aed somewhat the sane view as Bevln
and cade a eu^estlon to thla effects
Cannot the Council ecree to permit the two parties to ne&otlatO voluntarily end Keep the Council 
Informed until a mutually satlsfactorj solution 
Is found la accordance with justice!?»
• »
Taking note that thla was the first case brought before
tiio Security Council end that It called for the greatest
care on the pert of the Council In dealing with It, Welllngtoh 
27Koo (China) said the Idea presented by the United States28
delegate vas a good oae. Also the Soviet delegate should
be concratuiated for his assurances of good w111# The29
French representative, Georges Bidault, also argued that this
26. Ibli., P# 58.
27. V.E. Wellington Koo, (1868- ) became minister of
foreign affairs In 1922, 1924, and*1931» and vas prime 
minister In 1927. He was a member of the world court, 1932- 23» and was also a delegate to the League of nations Assembly 
and Council, 1932-39. In 1945 he was a representative to the uaCIO, and In 1946 to the General Assembly and the Security 
Council,
28. Security C‘>uncil Cfflelsl RecoNs. First Year, First 
Series, Lo,!,, 58^9.
29. Georges Bidault, (1899^ ) î̂ as leader of the popular den00ratio party and was elected president of the national 
resistance oouncll, 1943. Ho was twice minister of foreign 
affairs clnco 1944, and was once prenler-presldent. Ho was a member of the council of foreign ministers, and was 
chairman of the Fr.noh delegation to the UXIO, 1945 and 
the General Assembly and Security Ctmoncll, 1946,
T.
30case waa Inportant froa the standpoint of precedent,
Becauce he adhered.to the view that the parties to the dispute 
should to allowed to negotiate end that the Council retain 
the rlcht to reconsider the question at any time If the ne^o- 
tatlons failed, Bidault approved of the attitude of the antl- 
Sovlet bloc.
»
A point of view differing:fran the la^t four now cone
31to llcht when lycjaunt Ilod&elcwahl (Poland) baclwd the Soviet
represontatlvo’s idea to have tîoe partie a settle the dispute
32
by direct negotiation, ft. divergence between the Soviet bloc 
and the antl-Sovlet,bloc can be noted fron the way in vhUh 
the mecbers of the Council ezjresscd their vlews^ Poland 
usually followed the Soviet lead and usually was the only 
ono on the Soviet side,
33Blco IT.-van*Eleffens (Netherlands) made a proposal
34which he thought would meet the case. It followed some­
what the Stettlnlus suĉ estlofn. In tMt while the parties
30. Security Council" Officiai F̂ cords» First fear. First Series, &o.l., p. 59.
31. lycnunt Ilodzelewskl, (1900- ) was an officer in the 
Polish army In «‘orld War, 1%, and was anbasaador to the U,s,S.R, 
Ind was minister of foretco affairs, 1945. I je was represent­ative to the Ccneral. Assembly and Security Council, 1946.
32. Deourity Council Official Rggorda, First lear. First
Series, No.l., p. 60.1 *
33# Elco van KLeffens, (1894- ) became a menbor of the
eeoretarlat of the Lea^uo of liatione, 1919-21, and was In the 
ministry for foreign affolrs, 1923-29. He was chief of the 
diplomatic oectljo, 1929^39, and was minister without port­folio and Netherlands representative on the Security Council 
and Economic and Social Commission, 1946-47.
34. Security Council C^ielrl Rcccî lc, First rear. First 
Series, No.l.V pp. o^O^l.
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would negotiate directly, the question would be kept on 
the agenda. Speaking not as the president of the Council, 
but as the representative of Australia, Xakin agreed with 
the British, American, Chinese, French and Netherlands 
representatives, i.e.. that the question should be kept on 
the agenda.
Bevin withedto hear the Netherlands delegate’s pro­
posal read in full, and van Kief fens complied. After he 
had heard Ithat was proposed, Bevin suggested two amendments 
that negotiations should be resumed Immediately, and that 36
the parties should Reep the Council informed of the results*
These suggestions were ccmsldered tantamount to a resolution.
Although favourably impressed with Bevln’s suggestions,
Stettlnlus wanted it understood that the question would
remain on the agenda, Bevln said that this was intended,
and the two western allies as usual reached agreement! As
he saw nothing different in the two proposals, van Kief fens
withdrew his proposal for the British*
A different idea.came into the discussion when Mod-
zelewdki suggested the substitution of another text for the
last part of Bevin'0 resolution, to the effect that no time
limit be placed on the disputants to report the progress of
37the negotiations taking place between them. Bavin Immediately
35- ItId.. PP. 61t62,
3̂ # -Ibid.a p. 63.
37. Ibid.. P. 65*
tooKexception and brought Article 35 Into the discussion*
If the Polish amendment were accepted, Bevin aî ued. It 
Would mean that the Council had heard the question and had 
gotten rid of It without seeing that results had been achieved, 
After being quiet for sometime, Vyshinsky now got back
Into the discussion. Since the question did not threaten
3S
world peace. It could not remain on the agenda* Therefore,
there were no Grounds for Bevlrta resolution, and It should
be removed from the agenda. - He also intimated that there
was more to the British proposal than met the eye. I.e..
tliat the British representative had some other reason than
a desire to settle the dispute* Bevln denied the Soviet
charge and was sure that if Vyshinsky looked at the matter
**ln a reasonable way and without suspicion,* he o:uld see
39the legality of the resolution* The resolution was pro­
posed, not out of any .distrust of the Soviet government, 
but to fulfill the obligations Imposed by the Charter*
Declaring that the question of leaving or of not leaving 
the matter on the agenda was merely a formality. Zoo asserted 
that the Council had the po:>er and the responsibility to 
Investigate any question or situation which might affect 
world peace In general. Of this he was certain, he regarded
38* The Security Council can discuss only disputes or 
situations that threaten the maintenance of world peace*
39# Security Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Series, No* 1., p. 67.
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the proposal that the question remain on the agenda as pure
formality# If the negotiations were satisfactory, the Council
would be only too happy to take the question off the agenda#
If the negotiations were unsuccessful, Ine or the other
party would be back to present its case, and the Council
again would consider the question. With respect to the
Iranian question, this seemed to be one of the most logical
deductions yet presented that ascertained the Council*s power
and responsibility.
The President wished to know whether the Council felt
like adjourning, but Vyshinsky wanted to know why the dis*
cuasion should be interrupted again; he wanted to **take“
40
a decision. The debate continued, and the Iranian rep-#
resentative stated that Iran would negotiate only were the
dispute to remain before the Council, If the small natior/s
appeal were dismissed, the small nation’s of the world would
lose confidence‘in the Security Council,
Kodzelewski made an accurate remark when he called
attention to the fact that. If the members started referring
to the various articles of the Charter, justification could
42
be found for anything. He wanted a vote taken on his amend­
ment to Bevln*8 resolution, since he thought his amendment 
was the best submitted.
40, Ibid.. p. 69, 
4l# Ibid*, p, 69, 
42. Ibid,, pp, 69-70.
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Before a vote ooulü be taken on Kod2;elcwskl*a amondT 
ment, Bevln read bis resolution?
Having heard the statements by the represent­
atives of the Soviet talon and Iran In the coarse 
of its meetings of 28 and.30 Jonuaiy, and
Having taken .̂ cqr̂ izance of the documents 
preacnted by the Soviet and Iranian delegations and those referred to In the course of the oral debates;
Considering that both parties have affimed 
thqlr readiness %o seek a solution of the matter at Issue by negotiation; and that such negotiations 
will be roeuned.ln the near future;
Requests the J>ajrtles to Inform the Council 
of any results achieved in each negotiations*
The Oouncll la the meanwhile retains the right 
at any time to request Information on the progress Qf tl'iS negotiations*^^
T!ie president asked Hodzelcwskl If ho wished to proceed 
with his oneadncnt* The Polish delegate replied In the 
affirmative and gave as his reason that he objected to the 
words In the third paragraph, * and that such negotiations 
will be resumed In the near future** He would accept the 
resolution if these words were deleted, bcdause then his 
proposal and Bevin*s would not diverge* After Bevln had 
maintained that Hodzelewckl had proposed nothing different, 
the situation was cleared .up by Stettlnlus. Since he 
was the only one who had insisted on the words ^remaining 
on the agenda,* he was willing to accept Bevin*a proposal
43* Ibi^., p* 70*
Al
with the xcî erstaâ llns that the question woiilJi renaln a 
coatlnulnj concern of the Cc&noll until a SLttleaent had 
been reached# Hodzelewskl said Uio nlcunderctandlnc vas 
because of his poor Sn^lsh end withdrew his amendzncnt# The 
resolution proposed by the representative of the United
44
K\iïQüm was adopted unanimously, and tîie neetlnc was adjourned*
17
With out taking: time Ocaapletelj to orcsnlze Itself 
or to adopt rules of procedure and general ovcmll policies, 
the Security Council, at Its second neetlnc, considered, 
the Iranian question* It did not evade its responslhlllty 
as son© observers had feared,and it showed the determination 
of the delegates to cmke a working orcnnlsatlon out of the 
United Narrions and to avoid. If possible, another world 
conflict.
The Iranian dispute showed quite clearly the growing 
rift between the Soviet and antl-Sovlet blocs. Uhen Poland, 
part of the Soviet satellite system, was the only nation 
to back the Soviet Uniœi^s proposals, the split became 
quite obvious. It secned as if there wore & persc»ial antag­
onism between the United ICincdoa representative, Levin, end 
the Soviet representative, Vyshlnslty* Since his resolutlcxi 
was adopted, Bevln ccersed the victor in these particular
44# Ibid*, p. 71#
nee tines In his debate with Vyehlnslgr* Since the Soviet 
delegate* who at all tlzea had clalined that It was illeesl 
to Include the question on the abends^ ended by not opposing 
the adoption of the resolution^ the Zevln resolution yas 
adopted unanimously»
 ̂The American delegate, Stettlnlus, expressed himself 
very briefly and then only to back Dev in. Th® main play 
of wordfvWas between the Soviet representative on one hand 
and thê  United Klogdoa representative with support fRoa 
the Chinese, Frencĥ  Netherlands, Snerlcan and the Iranian 
delegates on the other#
TXiB United Klagdoa resolution was passed amid hopes 
that the Iranian question would be settled by negotiation 
and c o ^  ,forgotten-,, The question already had placed 
4 strain on the new United Nations, and axie observers 
felt that It vas not Important enough to jeopardize the 
future of the organization#
- A9
CHAPTER 3.
THE SOVIET walkout
I
The hopes end expectations of the members of the 
Security Council that they were through with the Iranian 
question were not fulfilled• The Security Council was no 
sooner settled in its new quarters at Hunter College* New 
York than the Iranian dispute confronted _it again# The 
first meeting of the Security Council in its new quarters 
was on %irch 25# 1946, and the Iranian question came up 
on March ̂ 6#
A letter dated March 18, 1946 from the Iranian rep-
♦resentative to the see re tàryy general and a indentical copy 
to the president of the Council brought the question directly 
to the attention of the Security Council* The Iranian gov- 
eminent presented its case under Article 35» paragraph 1, 
of the Charter, the same art idle it had used when fimt pre­
senting its case. While the note mentioned new troubles 
that had developed eince the adoption of the Bavin resolution, 
Soviet Intervention in Iranian affairs and the presence of 
Soviet'troops cm Iranian soil were still the main Iranian 
eomplaints* The Iranian government maintained that it wished 
to remain an Independent and sovereign state, and the 
immediate and Just solution of the dispute by the Security
1. Security Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Series, Supplement Ho# 2#, Hunter College, the Bronx, Hew 
York, pp. 43r44.
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Council waa of the greatest Importance for the preservation
of good relatlcms with the U»3»S.R*2
Andrei Gromyko, representing the Soviet Union In place 
of Vyshinsky^ said that the U^S.S.R, "placed a great amount
of faith" in the Security Council as the chief organ for
- 3the maintenance of world peace end security* After assuring
the Council of Soviet belief in the United Nations and of
Soviet disbelief in the domination of one country of another^
Gromyko proceeded to attack the Iranian letter along the
lines already set down by Vyshinsky* An understanding had
been reached between the disputants * the evacuation of
Soviet troops had begun. In particular, on I-larch 24* Stating
that there was no reason for the Inclusion of the "so called
Iranian question" and that negotiations were continuing,
the Soviet delegate made a proposal to the effect that the
Iranian question not be placed on the agenda* The Inclusion
2* Andrei Gromyko, (1909̂  ) became counselor to the embassy
In Washington, 1939-̂ 3, and was deputy minister for foreign affairs, 1946* In 1945, he was acting chainmn of the Ü.3.S.R* 
delegation to the UNCIO, and In 1946 he became a permanent 
representative to the United Nations.
3* Security Council Official Records* First Year, First 
Series, No. 2., Hunter dollege, New ’ York, (25 >îarch to 26 ̂ une, 1946), p. 10.
4# Ibid.. p* XI*
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of the question nov contradict the neonlog and the
spirit of the resolution previously adopted on January 30#
Byrnes, now representing the U.S.A., Immediately took
5Iscue with the Soviet representative* If there had been an 
understanding between the two disputants, why was there not 
a joint statement to that effect? It was intimated by 
Bymes that all that was contemplated was the adoption of 
a acenda thatwuld £lvc the Iranian rovcmncnt an opportunity 
to present foots which In Its opinion constituted a threat 
to International peace*
The solidarity of the antl-Sovlet bloc was again proved6
as Sir Alexander Cadogan, now representing the United king­
dom, endorsed what the United States representative had Just 
stated* Tliere were two aspects to the question according 
to Cadogani Cl) the resolution of January 30th (the 2e1rln 
resolution) permitting the Council to request infonnation 
on the progress of negotiations between the disputants, and 
(2) the new Informatl.:n presented by the Iranien representative,
5. PP. 1>15#
6* Olr Alexander George liontagu Cadogan, )lecanea delegate to-the League of lîations, and from 1933 to 1946 he was permanent under secretary of state for foreign affairs* 
and attended all the Big Three conferences in U'orld i.ar II*Ha was responsible for the 1st draft of the Atlantic Charter 
and was the chalmon of the United Kingdom delegation at 
tunbarton Oaks, 1944* In 1945, he vas a cenber of the united 
Kingdom delegation to the U3CI0, and to the General Assembly 
ond the Security Council in 1946*
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A third aspect also raised which Cadoccn thought ispartant,
Jthe question of ccwîfldence, "confidence thnt the oonctlty ̂
- Tof .treaties will bo respected. He referred to the trl-* 
partite trooty In this respect and the Soviet violation of It, 
Other repre son tat Ives of the Council oĉ l̂n gravitated 
to one bloc or another. The Matrallan delegate stimarlJisd 
the position of the antl-Sovlet tloc when he no Id:
ÎTow we ask ourselves two questions. First 
Is the subject natter of this aliened dispute one which cornes within the competence of the 
council? The answer, to ny nlnd, IJs jes. The 
second quest loir Is; has It been properly p resented; 
The answer to that Is also yes. In the original 
letter to the Secretary «-General of 19 March, 
two parties to the dls;ate are naned. One of 
those parties only has requested that this part- 
Icluar Item should not be included In the apenda,
Ke have no information, no evidence before ue 
whstevcr.
Therefore the view of the Australian dclccatloa 
is thet^thlQ .question should be pieced on the 
acenda,^
9îîasaan Pacha, now representing Frypt, screed with the 
antl-Sovlet bloc,
10
Oscar Lance, (Poland) however, supported the Soviet
Î* Seouritv Council Official Records. First lear. First 
Series, No.2,, p. 15*
8, Ibid.. p. 16.
9# Mahüioud Hassan Pasha, (l89j5- ) was educated In law.
He was the first Fcyptian nlnieter to the Scandanavlan 
countries, 193^^1958 and was minister to the Ü.3.A*, 1938-#
He was a representative to the üHCIO In 1945, and in 1946 to the General Assembly and the Security Ccuncll.
10. Oscar Lange, (1904- ) became a professor of economics,
end taught in Poland and the U.S.A. Ho was embassador to 
the U.S.A., 1945-47 and was representative to the Security 
Council, 1946*
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bloo# He 6u(%]08ted that the Iranian conplaint he deleted 
from the agenda of this particular moating though ho wanted 
the question Kept on the agenda in the Ecnuo that the Council 
was hound to do so under the Bovin resolution* Lange inter­
preted the term "agenda" to aaan the particular meeting in
progress, and he therefore thought it proner to move the deletion11Of the question from the agenda of this particular meeting*
Van ïdeffens thought that the Polish proposal was "quite 
complicated*" ^11 that had to be dono was to apply Article 31 
to the case. Tills article states that any member of the.
United Hâtions may participate in Security Council meetings 
without the right to vote* if its interests arc affected*
The o^er members, wltn the exception of the Polish delegate# 
toô the antl-Covlet bloc’s position on t ie Inclusion of the 
question on. the agenda*
Since the basic ideas of Articles and 35 were to 
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter 
that threatened world peace# Cr̂ nyho doclarod that the 12United States delegate’s argument conflicted with the Charter* 
The Iranian question did not meet this qualification* After
11* Security Council Official Hecorda. First Zear, First 
Series, Ho.2», pp* l6-lo*
12* Ibid** pp. 19-22*
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attackin» the apeaohea by Bymea and Gadogon, the Soviet 
delegate said there vaa no doubt as to the truth or the 
Soviet statement on the results achieved during the course 
of the negotiations with Iran* To protect himself and to 
discredit tlwj anti-Soviet bloc’s argumenta, Gron̂ yho.brought 
up the British otand in the Syrlan-Î cbcnon ease* The British 
la this case had "opposed any mention whatsoever of a time­
limit for the withdrawal of British forces from Syria and 
Lebanon * Gromyko also intimated that the Iranian prime
minister had no knowledge of tho preeentatl.>n of the questionl4
to the Council by Hussein Ala, the Iranian mambassddor to the 
United States*
Slnoe It was well over an hour after 12 noon, the president 
15 ,now Quo Tal-Chl, (China), proposed that thobeetlnc be adjourned
until the next afternoon, because the representatives of
Egypt, Mexico, and the United States wished to speak# But
on a proposal by Byrnes, the president celled tho next meeting
for 3 p*m* the same afternoon*
13# Ibid.. p* 21*
14 Hussein Ala, (1582- ) was chief of the cabinet of the
ministry of foreign affairs, from 1906-17. He was a rorslan delegate to Versailles peace conference, 1919-20, and was 
minister plenipotentiary to Sea In, 1920. From 1921-24 he was 
chief envoy to the U.S.A*, and was minister to France 1927^32, 
and a delegate to the League of Nations# lie was Iranian 
ambassador to the U*S#A« in 1946*
15* Quo Tal-Chl, (1888- ) woo a member of the Jhlnese delegation
to the Paris peace conference, 1919 and to the League, 1932-33.
He was minister of foreign affairs 1941-44, and was a jrep- 
reeentatlve to tho General Assembly and the Security Council, 1946
Aa cbaraoterlôtla of tl:e London aeetln&s* the division 
of opinion betvera the east and west a^aln cane to 11 ̂ht in 
the twenty-fifth ncotins* The two blocs continued to oppose 
each other$ andy as la London̂  the anti-Soviet bloc with the 
preponderance of the votes could have its own way in pro­
cedural matters# The Soviet representative# though ably 
stating hla case (that he did net want tho (question iaclUiled 
on tho abonda) by questioning the lec&lity of the Council’s 
action under articles 34 and 35* was unable to influence 
the members of the anti-Soviet bloc#
II
The twenty-sixth meet ins was held according; to Bymei'* 
wishes the same afternoon# and the discussion of the agenda 
a&ain involved the Iranian question# The Egyptian repre­
sentative was the first to speak# Dividing the problem 
into two parts he said. First# can the petition of the Iranian
Government to this Council be received? Second# if so, may16
we ask about the facta and noT& them#** The Council had **put
the cart before the horse,** since it had been discussing
the seocNfid part of the problem# He proposed that:
###the Council reoelve the complaint of the 
Iranian Government embodied in its several 
memoranda addressed to the Secretary-General 
and sskfor an immediate vote on this question alone.IT
16» Cjurnn Official Records* First iear̂  FirstSerlea, «0,2., pp. 22-2?.
17. p. 23.
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Bymes also thought that a vote should he taken on
whether the question should he included on the agenda. Since
the Soviet representative had made a proposal to delete the18
question from the agenda, he wanted a vote taken on it*
The representative of a email power, Francisco Castillo 
19Rajera, (Kexico) brought up the email power's viewpoint#
If the violation of the trl-partite treaty did n^t constitute
a menace to international peace, "then all the small nations20
are at the mercy of the stronger ones.* Under no circum­
stances would he accept Gromyko*s interpretation#
The question of procedure soon.entered the discussion 
because Lange did not think that it was the proper procedure
to vote on a motion to remove the Iranian question from the21
agenda# Henri Bonnet,the French delegate, thought that the 
Council should adopt the agenda unanimously and postpone
IS. IMd,> p# 23.
19# Francisco Castillo Sajera, (1886- } became minister
to China, Belgium, Hollanu and France, 1922-25, and was. 
ambassador to the U.S.A., 1935-45. He was foreign minister, 1945-46, end was representative to the liZJSlO, 1945# I#
1946 he was chairman of the l<Jexlcan delegation to the General Assembly and the Security Council#
20. Security Council Official Records. Firfat Tear, First Series, «o,2,, p# 24#
21. Henri Bonnet, (1888- ) became a member of the League 
of îJatiOQS secretariat, first in the division of press infor­
mation, and later as executive-eecretary of the assistant 
secretary-general of the League, 1920-31# He was ambassador to the U.8.A# in 1944, and was a representative to the UHCIO 
in 1945 and to the Security Council In 1946.
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22
discussion of the question until later; This statement 
was the forerunner of a French proposal that later was to 
split the solidarity of the antl»̂ Soviet bloc;
After. Cadogan had commented on the point of procedure 
raised by the Polish representative, and Castillo lîajera 
had stated that all that had to be done vas to VDte on 
Item 4 of the agenda. I.e.. the letters from the countries
23concerned, Gromyko again proceeded to argue the Soviet case.
He agreed with the French representative, because It was 
also hla vlev not to discuss the Iranian question; He also 
vented to know If his proposal would be voted on If It came 
after the vote on acceptance of Item 4 of the agenda;
The debate over the agenda was beginning to get confused 
at this point; The Council spent a good deal of Its time 
arguing over matters .that seemed trivial, but It must be 
remembered that the Council then was establishing procedure 
to be used In later meetings, end the members wanted to get 
every tiling straightened out to their eàtlàfactlon;
The Polish and Soviet delegates disagreed on whether 
or not the Soviet proposal was an amendment or not* Deciding 
that the Soviet proposal was an amendment to Item 4 of tho 
agenda, the president proceeded to put It to a vote; the 
Soviet amendment was defeated by a vote of 9-2, end again
Security Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Seflee, #0*2;, pi 24.
23: Ibid:. P: 2 5#
tho antl-Sovlet bloo had triumphed In a strictly procedural 
24
matter.
Undaunted by this defeat, Gromyko now asked the Council 
to postpone discussion of the question until April 10* Post­
ponement was necessary because important ne&otlatlons were 
then going on, and the Soviet Union needed until that date 
to submit the results to the Council, This was *..,a minimum 
demand on the part of the Government of the U.S,S,R* and*.*25this demand Is fully Justified, After making more dis- 
paraging remarks about the Iranian government and Its dele­
gation, Gromyko formally proposed the postponement of the 
question until April 10, and he declared that were the proposal
not adopted he could not take part in the discussion of the 26
queition* The Council was not enlightened as to what he 
ment by not being prepared to take part in the discussion. 
Probably on the assumption that the Council would give into 
his demands, the Soviet representative in fact had threatened 
It, However, the Soviet assumption proved to be wrong,
Hassan Pasha again brought up the proposal he had ifahde 
that morning, i.e.. that the Council vote on the inclusion 
of the Iranian complaint. Agreeing with the Egyptian delegate’s
24. Ibid.. p. 27,
25. Ibid., p. 28;
26. Ibid.. p. 30,
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proposal, and thinking that the Iranian delegate should 
he heard conoeming the April 10 postponement, Bymes made 
the following statement|
Therefore If the representative of Egypt 
moves as a substitute for the motion of the 
representatives of the USSR that the represent­
atives of the Iranian Government be permitted to 
participate In accordance with the Charter* I 
shall be happy to support that motion. If he 
does pot with to make the taotlon, then I will made the mot Ion * 27
Bymes was determined to have a vote taken on whether the 
Iranian question should be Included on the agenda, even to 
the point of Ignoring the other proposals on the floor. 28
The Australian representative. Colonel William Hodgson, 
now presented a completely different proposal. To post­
pone the case until written documents should be received
29from both the U*S*S«£« and Iran was the gist of his suggestion* 
yhen the documents had been received, the Oounoll should then 
fix a date for the Investigation of the question by the Council 
Itself* Although prepared to give favorable consideration
27. Ibid*, p. 51*
23.* Lieut. Colonel william H, Hodgson, (1892- > had an
army and diplomatic carrer* He was a representative to 
the UNCIO In 1945* and In 1946 was a member of the Australian 
delegation th the United Nations, and was Australian delegate 
to the Security Council the same year.
29# Security Council Offlclaj Records. First Year, First 
Series, No* 2., pp. 31-3g*
to the Soviet requeat to postpone the question, Rod̂ reoa 
wqnted it clearly understood that the question should re­
main on the agenda and that action would be taken when the 
written documents were received*
The Council now was faced with the dilemma of having 
three motions before It without adequate rules, of procedure 
to guide It* The members were never more conscious of the 
lack of these procedural rules, and they were slow to set 
precedents that would be used In later cases*
While supporting the Egyptian proposal, Cadogan said
that he could not understand why the Soviet representative
30
needed this delay* It would be better to hear-the Iranian 
delegate In person than to receive'written material, aa the 
Australian representative had suggested* The Iranian delegate 
was sitting in the audience and was ready at any time to 
take his seat at the Council table to present the necessary 
evidence*
The Australian representative, however, was supported 
by Lange, because the Polish delegate In giving his support 
to Hodgson fulfilled the wishes of the Soviet Union* Again 
attacking the Egyptian proposal',. Gromyko said that It was 
contrary**to common sense*" Castillo Ha]era here broke into
30* Ml.» pp. 33-34.
31. Ml., Pè 34*
the debate and made some rather pointed renarka about
32the Soviet and roXiah representatives. Gronyho had 
mentioned a statement made by the Iranian prime minister, 
Ghavaa, In which Ghavam vaa supposed to have expressed hope 
that positive résulta would come :ut of the negotiations.
But as Castillo Najera sarcastically noted, the Soviet delegate 
had received his information from the press, and the press 
as everyone knew was not always accurate. After noting 
Lange*a statement that communications between Iran and the 
United States were poor and that therefore the Council should 
wait for Information, Castillo ̂ Jera sold that he wanted to 
hear the Iranian representative*8 personal opinion on this 
point*
The viewpoint of the small nations was pleaded by Bymes 
when he remarked that It was a "rather renarksblc procedure** 
that the Imnlen government should be permitted to present 
Its case, but that Its representative could not be heard.
He imagined a case In which International peace was threatened
and In which the Council would say, "lour representative say
 ̂ • 33attend, but he may not present his cas*# He warned that
the small nations might lose faith In the. United nations, if 
32. fhld.- pp. 35"~3̂ #
33# mi.# p. 36.
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tha Iranian representative were not allowed to speeLk*
Since there were six small pawers on the Council, and since34
he needed seven affirmative votes to pass the proposal
35he desired, Byrnes pleaded the small powers cause.
The debate now became more and more a personal and
national struggle between Byrnes and Gromyko when the latter
36acidly answered Bymes* statement. If the question were 
being considered in its substantive rather than its pro­
cedural aspect, the Iranian delegate would have a right to 
sit at the Council table. At the moment, the question of 
Whether the Iranian delegate should be permitted to make 
a statement on the postponement only confused things.
Van Eleffens attitude was that the Iranian delegate 
had a right to be seated under Article Jl, and **that was 
that,* Again Byrnes demanded a vote on the Egyptian proposal 
and asked;
If the representative of the USSR should say 
that he desired to postpone consideration until 
1 January next year, would anyone say that would not vitfidly affect the Iranian Government and 
that it should not be permitted to make a state-ment.^ü
34, Article 27 of the United Nations Charter; **1, Each 
member of the Security Council shall have one vote, 2, 
Decisions on procedural matters shall be made by an affir^ 
native vote of seven members,"
35# Security Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Series, No, 2., pp, 36-27*
36, Ibid,# pp. 37-38.
37« %bid,, p* 38,
8̂. Ibid.. n* "̂ 8.
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Kow the question of the three proposais oaae up^
President Quo Tal-Chl was not quite ole&r just what to do#
He deteraloed the fact that there were two notions on the
floors one by the Soviet representative, and one by the
Egyptian delegate. But the Australian notion puzzled him.
He ruled that a vote should be taken in the order in which
they had been presented* first the.Soviet proposal, then the
Egyptian proposal, and last the Australian proposal. And
after the Iranian representative had been heard, the Council
then would be In a better position to consider the question
of postponement. The president seemed quite sure that the
Iranian delegate would be heard, and it was quite obylous
at this point that the majority of the members were of the
same opinion#
Wanting to make sure that his views were correctly
understood, Hodgson declared that he had no objection at
all to the seating of the Iranian delegate, but he wanted to40
get all thê facts of the case. Hassan Pasha after informing
the Council that he was a Judge, said tliat the Council wcB
a tribunal and that the members of the Council were in 41
fact Judges# They had every right to decide whether.-tho
39. Ibid.. pp. 33-39. 
AO, Itli... pp. 39-40. 
41, pp, 4@-4l.
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3&8* should he postponed or not. He rejected the Australian 
vlowpDlnt when he maintained that It was up to the tribunal 
to decide whether the evidence it w:uld consider was to 
be oral or written.
By this time. Lance vac tirod* Kc thOv̂ rht that it
would be better to "attack the problem with clear minds"
end succestcd that the Council should adjourn until the next
day# But the French representative proposed that the
question of voting be referred to a sub-cooaittee for a
compromise solution. After acrceinc with Sonnet» the pres-*
ident appointed ^ sub—committee made up of the repre sent-
42atives of the U#S.A#*the U.S.S.R., and France. The sub­
committee was to report by 3 p.a. the following day on any 
pro£reea it bad made, and the proposal was adopted by 9 
votes. The meeting was then adjourned.
After much fruitless argument over the inclusion of 
the Iranian question on the agenda and the seating of the 
Iranian delegate, the question was side-stepped for the 
mmnomen) with the appointment of the eub-c omit tee. There 
seemed very little chance that the aub-comnittee would solve 
anything, since its members probably would he op their same 
views. When the Council was confronted with three motions 
at the same time, this sub-committee was established to 
try to work out a compromise solution, and to set forth
42. Ibia.. pp. 42-43.
eoae method of procedure tliot opuld he followed In the future*
III
Tho twenty-seventh meeting of the Security Council 
was held on March 27* 1946* It opened with the report of43tha Buh-conialttee that nothing; had been accanpllshed*
The Council, therefore, was in the same dllen^a as at the 
end of the last meeting
: Longe said that he vas sorry to hear thet the sub- 
coomitteehad failed* Kow it was hie idea to consider the 44
Australian proposai.second and the Egyptian proposal third#
If the Egyptian.proposal were voted on first, the Australian 
proposal would be lost* His .reasoning was not lost on the 
Council* If the Egyptian proposal were approved, the Iranian 
represnntatlve would be heard, and the Australian proposal* 
which Lange supported would not have a . chance to be voted rm# 
îhis was the beginning of a long and heated debate over 
which notion should be voted on first, but it was finally 
decided to vote aft the president earlier had suggested 
This debate typified the confusion and uncertainty in which 
the Council sometime found Itself while trying to settle
43. &ocuz'ity Council̂  ̂ ourMal. First Year, :io*21, 2 April, 1946* 
P. 407.
4 4I Ibid.. p* 408*
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difficult questions of procedure*
The president, throughout the discussion arcaed In 
favor of the votlnc procedure that he had sû cested* If 
the C*C*S.R. proposal were not adopted, the Î ciptlaa pro­
posal then would te vôted on, and If it pacsed there .wouldA5
he no need for a vote on the Australian proposal* The
Australian représentâtlye disagreed* Hodgson asked the
president to coînply* with the Polish request to put his pro-46
posfil second in the voting* The president, however, contended 
that tho proposals were of equal importance and that they 
should to voted on in the order of their presentation*
When the time oamè to vote, he wDuld te [lad to hear the 
Views of the other members on this subject*
not understanding what the Australian delegate meant, 
Hassan Pasha wanted to know whether the Iranian representative 
was to produce the documents (called for tj rlod̂ son) In 
person or while absent. The Iranian delegate should not 
present the documents, in person at tho moment, was Hodgsoh**47
Idea* He realized that the Iranian representative was sitting 
In the nudenoe with a prepared statement, but ho wanted 
the facts submitted in writing. Then he and the other 
members could study them, at leisure end get a clear picture
45. Smcurltv Council Officiai Records!. First Year, First 
Series, IÎ0.2., n* 45*
46. IbjLd.. pp. 45-46.
47. Ibll.. PP. 45-47.
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of just "ichat was what" before they took action on the 
case.
After expressing his "regret" over the failure of the 
flub-*cooimittee, of which he was a member and in which he had 
refused to compromise his position, Gromyko restated his 
position that negotiations were taking place and that an 
understanding had been reached# Evidence of this under- 
stalnglng was the Soviet announcement that Soviet'troops 
would be withdrawn# Grcxayko had received his information 
from the official U.S.S.R. news agency in the United States, 
Tass# that Ghavam, the Iranian prime minister, had said that 
the question of Azerbaijan was relatively unimportant and 
could be solved as soon as an understaiding was reached
conoeming the withdrawal of Soviet troops# In the light
»
of these circumstances. It was "incomprehensible" that the
members of the Council were unable to accept the "fully
Justified proposal of the USSR Government to postpone the
48discussion of the Iranian statement until April 10*"
With the remark that the United States -delegation 
received its Information, not from the newspapers, but dir-* 
eotly from the Iranian government, Bymes refuted the infor­
mation presented by the Soviet delegation, Hia information
contradicted Gromyko’s statement in that the Iranian government
49
formally had said no agreement had been reached. It was not
48* Ibid.. p. 49* 
49* Ibid.. pp, 49-51*
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proper for the Council to act on a newspaper statement,
while the official representative of Iran was sitting In
the audience with an official statement in hla possession*
50Another method of voting was proposed hy Bymes,
The Egyptian proposal should be voted on first, and if It
were carried there would be no need for votlnc on the Soviet
proposal, After the Iranian representative had been heard.
If the Council desired. It could vote on the Australian
proposai* This ouchestion was entirely antl-Coviet, since
it would allow for thé adoption of the Australian proposal
even were the Ecyptian proposal to be adopted*
Van Kief fens o^ecd with Byrnes and ashed Cronylco what
his reasons were for wanting to postpone the discussion until 
51April 10, He would be "enllghTened" If the Soviet represent­
ative would "elucidate" on the questions asked. An indirect 
reference to British troops on Egypt Ian soil was then n&de 
by Hassan Pasha, when he said, "Wo (the small nations) 
want the big pov/ers to know that if an independent" country
does not want to have foreign troops stationed on its Bollĝ
52the big powers should comply with that, He was speaking 
of the Iranian situation at the tine, but the remark
50. Security Council Journal, First Year, Ho,2l, 2 April, 
1946, pp, 412-413.
51. Ibid.. p. 414,
52. Security Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Series, Ho,2,, p* 55.
Was pertinent to British troops on Egyptian soil*
At this point the president closed the discussion hy
asking for a vote on Lange * s proposal to place the Australian
resolution In the voting order Immediately following the
U*S.S.R* proposal* Gromyko, however. Ignored the president
5:5and addressed a **few remarks'* to the Council members*
If Bymes were so anxious to hear the opinion of the Iranian 
representative, wliy did he not see Ala outside the Council 
meetings, Moreover, the Iranian representative could ex­
press his opinion In private or could ocxnmunloaté with the 
secretary-general anytime he felt like It* Bymes* real 
reason, Gromyko charged, for not agreeing with the Soviet 
position was because he wanted to discuss the substance of 
the question*
Gromyko was getting a little heated when he turned 
to the Netherlands representative* He answered the questions 
put to him aa follows ; that direct negotiations were taking 
place, and that an understanding had been reached for the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops In five or six weeks "providing 
that nothing unforseen happens*” It made no difference 
whether the understanding was verbal or written, so long 
as It had been reached. Agalh the Council was threatened 
that, if.the discussion were not postponed, the U*S*S.S*
53. Ibid.. pp. 53-55.
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could not take further part In the discussion* The proposals
should be voted on In the order they were presented. This,
of course, suited Gromyko's purpose, since his proposal was
the first presented*
The president again declared the discussion closed*
This time he tried to put the U.5.S.R+ proposal to a vote,
but Gromyko again ignored him and attacked the procedure
for closing disaussiona* He wasnted to know if the president
could close the discussion without a dicision from the members
of the Council, as the president was trying to do* The
president replied that he had no more speakers on his list,
and Bonnet informed the president that he had no objection
to the president’s declaring the debate closed* But he
wanted the right to speak in explanation of how ha voted
55after the vote on the U*S.S*R* proposal was taken* Byrhes
55wanted the same right*
The U*2*S*R* proposal to postpone consideration of the 
Iranian question to April 10 was put to a vote by a show of 
hands, and waa rejected by a vote of 9-2. Poland and the 
U*G.S.R. voted in favor* The anti-Goviet bloc with nine 
votes effectively defeated the Soviet bloc on this pro­
cedural matter, Immedately after the vote was recorded,
54. IMâ*, P* 55.
55. Itid., p. 56*
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the president wanted to know the Council’s view on whether 
to vote next on the Egyptian or Australian proposals* Ejraes 
end Eassan fasha supported the view that the Egyptian pro­
posal should be next» and Hodgscai and twinge argued that the 
Australian proposal should be voted on before the Egyptian* 
The French representative was regj^tful that the Council 
could not agree unanaaiously on the procedural aspects of 
Articles 34 and 35# Ho would vote In favor of the Sgyptian
proposal, because, "although it does not Include all that
56
I have said, neither does it exclude it*"
Gromyko now carried out his Intention to walK out#
He and the other mesibcrs of the Soviet delegation left the 
Council cumber after he had made the following statement I
For reasons which I explained clearly enough at yesterdoy's meeting of the Security 
Cruncll and again‘at today’s meeting, I an not in a position, as tho representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republice, to take 
part , in a discussion of the Iranian questicai after the rejection of my proposal. For these 
reasons I am unable to take part In the CounciJ_ 
meetings and I am leaving tho Council chamber#"''
Tlio Cjoncll took tiie departure of the Soviet delegation
rather Impassively, except for.Bymes who twisted around
in his seat to watch the delegation leave, then Hodgson
conplsincd that he had two different texts of the Egyptlaa
proposal, the discussion continued as if nothing had happened, 
»
56; JUl., p. 55,
57. I^U.. P. 53.
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After ttpolO£lzlns for the delay in handlns out the texts of 
hia proposal» the Egyptian delegate stated his proposal 
again#
«••(the Counoil) should ask the Iranian rep" resentative to.come to tho Council table to give his views an the question Of postponement; then» if we think that postponemmt should not be granted̂  the Council canthke such action aa itdeem fit» which will be to ask him to producehis doc^ents concemlns the substance of the matter«-"°
Bymes noW took advantage of his earlier reservation
to speak following the vote on the î̂ ovlct proposal* He
had been prompted to speak, he said, when Gromyko had accused
» 59him of wanting to get into the substance of the question*
The Soviet charge waa denied* Ho called attention to the 
fact that it was he» Bymes» who had moved to amend the 
Egyptian proposal to permit the Iranian delegate to be heard 
on the subject of postponement*
Before the president put the Egyptian proposal to a
vote» he wanted to make sure that a decision could be taken
in the absence of the D#S*5#R* representative* He undeî  
stood that it was a purely procedural question and that a 
decision cculd be taken* Cadogan supported this view» 
and the Egyptian proposal was pqt to a vote* Again the
58, ikifl... P. 59.
59,'IÊli.t PP« 59-60,
«  7^ «"
vote was taken by a chow of hands; there were el^ht votes60
In favor, end It was adopted* The president then Inquired 
If the Australian representative wanted a vote on his pro- 
posai, end Hjd&son replied In the affirmative. £ymcs, 
however, nalntanled that the adoption of the Icyptlcn 
propocal ruled out the Australian proposal, tut Hodcson 
declared that his proposal was entirely different frora the 
Egyptian and shculd bo voted on* After considerable debate* 
the president ruled that the Australian proposal was auto­
matically dropped SB a result of the adoption of the Egyptian 
proposal. That ended the discussion. At the president*© 
Invitation, nusceln Ala, the representative of Iran, took 
his place at the Council table.
17
In its twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-^seventh 
meetings, the Security Coimcll was called upon a&aln to 
settle the dispute between Iren and the Soviet Union. As 
Boon as discussion began cn the Iranian question, the split 
between the anti-Sovlct end Soviet blocs was opaln evident. 
Even when the Australian delegate opposed the rest of the 
antl-Sovlet bloc, he did not advocate the Soviet solution 
for dispo^^ng of the question*
Under the leadership of Byrnes, the United States 
delegation took a much more active part In the discussion 
60. Ibid*, p. 6l*
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than it previously had done. The principal antagonists 
were now Byrnes and Gromyko, whereas in the London meetings 
it had been Bevin and Vyshihsky. With the support of the 
other members, exclusive of Lange and Gromyko, the United 
States and United Kingdom delegates gave each other full 
support.
The question of procedure continued to plague the 
hearings of the Iranian charges. Fully conscious that they 
were setting precedents for future action, the members 
spent most of their time arguing procedural matters. They 
had no rules to guide them, and therefore they had to feel 
their way along as best they could.
The Council was also confronted with a new situation, 
i.e.. the absence of one of its permanent members. This 
was the first time such a thing had happened. But the Security 
Council continued to discuss the Iranian question. After 
Gromyko walked out, the Council did not stop its work, nor 
did it show any sign of weakness. The continued discussion 
dealt With procedural problems, however, and, if the question 
had been in a substantive stage, it is doubtful whether the 
Council could have passed any resolutions or even continued 
discussion of the question. Had the absence of the Soviet 
representative been taken as a “veto” on a substantive matter 
the.discussion of the question would have ceased.
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Fortunately for Iran, for the United Nation, and for 
the antl-Sovlet bloc, the question vas procedural In nature. 
The Iranian representative, Hussein Ala, was seated at 
the Council table in spite of all that Gromyko had said 
and done to prevent»it*
mm- Y6
CHAPTER 4.
THE BÏRHE3 EESOLUTION
X
After the Soviet representative's walkout In the twenty-* 
seventh meeting, the president Quo Tal-Chl (China), Invited 
Ala to take a place at the Council table. But when, because 
of the lateness of the hour, the president asked for an adjourn­
ment to 3 p.m. the next day, Byrnes replied that Ala then 
and there should be permitted to meike his statement. The 
president accepted the United States delegate's view. Thus, 
with United States support, Ala presented his case, even at 
that late hour.
The Iranian representative said that Is was *̂ wlth emotion
that I take my seat before the highest tribunal on earth,1wherein lie the hopes and aspirations of mankind." After 
declaring that Xx%n firmly believed In the United Rations 
and expected that Justice would be meted out by the Security 
Council, Ala said that he knew of no agreement between the 
disputants covering the matters listed In the Iranian complaint 
to the Security Council. He was also positive In stating 
that the Iranian prime minister particularly had requested 
him to emphasize that, "the bringing of a dispute by one
1. Security Council Official Records.First Year, First Series, No. 2., Hunter College, New York, (25̂ ïarch to 26 
June, 1946), p. 62.
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Member of the United Batlona before the Security Council
should not be interpreted by other parties as an Inimical 2act** Presenting a report from the Iranian prime: Minister,
Ala gave the Soviet proposals for settlement of the dis­
pute* (l) that U*3*8.R. troopp remain in some parts of Iran 
for an indefinite period; (2) that the Iranian government 
reoognize the autoncsay of Azerbaijan within certain limits; 
and (3) that a joint 0*S*S*R*-Iranian stock company be formed 
with fifty-one per cent of the shares to be owned by the 
U»S*S.R, and forty-nine per cent by Iran* The prime minister 
had rejected these demands» and negotiations were deadlocked* 
The Soviet Union had offered to remove its troops from
seme of the norhtem provinces bpt would leave troops in
4the others “until the situation had been clarified»" After 
lodging a protest with the Soviet government in which he 
cited the pertinent articles of the tri-partite treaty, 
the Iranian prime minister had informed the Soviets that the 
British had withdrawn their troops in accordance with the 
treaty. He also said that the Soviet Union was contradicting 
Itself, since it had said it Intended to conform to the treaty 
but in practice had not done so, Ala had been Instructed to
2* Jb,id., p* ^3* 
3* Ibid»» pp# 64-65. 
4* Ibid», p. 65.
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present the dispute to the Council for a decision in
accordance with the powers and duties of the Council#
Byrnes interrupted at this point to request the Iranian
delegate to limit himself to the question of postponement
5rather than go into the substance of the matter# But
Ala thought it necessary to present the above views# Byrnes
again said that the Iranian representative should limit
himself to the question of postponement, and the president
agreed with him. Both Byrnes and the president seemed afraid
that if the discussion got into the substance of the question,
the absence of the Soviet representative could then have
an effect of a "veto* on any action taken by the Council
in respect to the question before It,
At this point, Lange reminded the Council that he had
raised the same point as the United States representative
and had been ignored# He hoped in the future that the6smaller nations would be given more consideration#
Since he opposed postponement and wanted to give the 
pertinent facts of the case, Ala said that he had to pre­
sent his argument in a logical sequence. Otherwise the 
Council could not appreciate the Iranian position. As he
5. iÈlâ..# p. 66.
6. p* 67.
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did not vfmt to augseat how the Iranian delegate should
present his oase* hut thinking It would be heZffdll It be
asked a few questionŝ  Byrnes Inquired whether Ala was
7authorized to agree to a postponement* He also wanted to 
know If there had been any change In Ala*a Instructions 
since he had filed the matter̂  and wondered what Ala thought 
were the dangers Involved In postponing the matter. Agreeing 
with Byrnes, Hassan Pasha, (Egypt), thought that the pre­
sentation of the Iranian viewpoint took too much time*
Having received no instructions to agree to a postpone­
ment, Ala enumerated his reasons opposing onet (l) that Iran 
was suffering from Interference In Its Internal affairs;
(2) that demands were being made upon Iran which were Incon­
sistent with Its sovereignty and territorial Integrity;
and (3) that the presence of foreign troops were a heavy8burden on the people* Since Iran would suffer still more
were the matter postponed, he requested that the Council
take up the matter Immediately.
Lange then ̂Jsegan what was to be a lengthy téte-k-tëte
9between himself and Ala In the meetings to come. Lange
7* Ibid., p. 87•
8. Ibid.. pp* 68-69.
9# Ibid.. p. 69.
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Inquired If Ale had received Instruct Iota to oppose a delay* 
After claiming that Ala had omitted a very Important point# 
I.e.* ^at Soviet troops were being withdrawn, Lange wanted 
to know If Ala had received any official Instructions relative 
to the withdrawal of troops from Iran* The Polish rep-* 
resentatlve quoted Gromyko** statement that the Iranian 
prime minister had acknowledged the fact that the ü*S*S*R* 
troops were being withdrawn and that Ghavam did not want 
outside pressure to be exerted In the negotiations between 
the dlaputauats* Be wondered if the Iranian delegate could 
confirm the truth of the Soviet representative’s statœaent* 
%ary of listening to the various statements and 
arguments for a number of hours# Hassan Pasha asked If the 
hearing could be postponed until the next day# The president 
agreed to this suggestion and adjourned the meeting.
In this twenty-seventh meeting, the Council had seated 
the Iranian delegate after the Soviet walkout, and had gone 
on with the dlscusslm of the question* Even so. It was all 
too noticeable that the members,especially the United 
States representative and the president, tried to prevent 
the discussion fz*om getting Into the substance of the Iranian 
question* Almost nothing was said about the Soviet absence 
and Its effect on the Council#
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II
The tveDtj-el£̂ th meeting was not held, however, until 
Maroh 29m A&alntha president invited the Iranian dele&ate 
to take his place at the Council table, and the tëte-̂ t̂ëte 
between Ala and Lan̂ e continued*
By saying that he had Instructions that were broad 
enpoah to permit him to take such action aa he deemed neces­
sary to protect his country, Ala firmly rebutted Lange’s 10suggestion that he had no Instructions to oppose a delay*
Jin answer.to.Lange*8 second question, Ala definetely stated 
%is had:no:̂ information̂  LOfflGlal'pr:other#ISê tbroorroberate 
the Soviet contention that Soviet troops were evacuating 
Iranian territory* Moreover, ha did not believe that Ghavam 
bad made any statement to the effect that outside pressure 
should not be brought to bear on the Sovlet-iranlan nego­
tiations»
Referring to the absence of the Soviet representative,
Ala regretted that Gromyko was not present to "correct at
first hand any misunderstanding on my part of the position11of his Qovcrnnent*" Gromyko’s remark that at the negotiations 
in Moscow between Iran and the Soviet Union, an essential 
phase of the negotiations, had been concluded was not tsue»
10* Ibid## pp* 71*T2*
II# Id * # p* 72*
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Hothlns had been settled̂  and at best Ala could only
agree that there had been a "misunderstanding,* The
Iranian government wanted Soviet "assuranoea" {to accompany
the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran) to be communicated
to the Council, and these "assurances* must Include a
guarantee that the Soviet Imlom wmild not go back on Its12work In evacuating Its troops.
Because he was confused on one point. Hassan Pasha
asked Ala what was the nature of the negotiations between
the Soviet Union and Iran. Ala replied that the Iranian
constitution forbade the prime minister to "enter into
any negotiations cmceming the evacuation of the country;
the withdrawal of the troops is In no way connected with
any negotiations. The withdrawal of the troops inust be 
. . 13unconditional. It was true that the prime minister, with 
the consent of .parliament,.! could enter Into'negotiation à' 
other than for the evacuation of troops. But the fourteenth 
parliament had expired, and the new parliament could not be 
elected until foreign troops were withdrawn.
On this point, Ala was seemingly inconsistent, since 
Ohavam had gone to Moscow for the express purpose of trying 
to settle the dispute by negotiations, emd Iran in presenting
12. Ibjd^, p. T2#
1% Ibii., p, 73.
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its ease to the Council claimed to conform to Article 35» 
which stated that countries should try to settle their dis*
putes 'X>j peaceful negotiation* Lange was quick to catch
Ala in this inconsistencyÎ
ÎÏOW I read in the newspapers» and I think it is an established fact, that the Prime Ministerof Iran was in Moscow, carrying out some negoti­ations or, if we must not use that term* convert satioae, while USSR troops still were on Iranian soil and I want to find out whether he broke the law and did negotiate or whether his purpose in going to Moscow was,, for Instance, merely to attend a * vodka party %**14
Contradicting the Polish delegate, Ala argued that
Ghavam had gone to Moscow in accordance with the January 30
resolution of the Security Council* The object of Ghavam*s
trip had been to request negotiations with the Soviet gov̂
ernment oonoeming the dispute* The "vodka party** was
explaihed this ways
He (Ghavam) was wined and dined and plenty of caviar also were served to him, but he stood firm for the independence of his country and» the essential rights of Iran and he did not yield vn a single point and maintained his 
attitude*15
When the president Inquired if there were other questions, 
Ala wanted to knm if he should retire frœa his place at 
the table, but the president allowed him to remain* Ala 
had stated his ease clearly and with great vigor* Although
14. Ibid.. p. 73.
15. Ibid.. p. 74.
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a frail blrdllke person barely five feat tall, he ably 
defended his case, more or.less successfully answered the 
«questions put to him, and adroitly handled Lange * a persisTg AfT 
heckling# Using the Bevln resolution as a shield, he cleared 
up the question of the prime minister's being able to nego­
tiate with the U,3.S.R« However, he did not refer to the 
negotiations prior to the Bevln resolution, but he seemed 
to eatlslfy the members who questioned him.
Byrnes proposed at this point to postpone the discussion
for a few days. He suggested that:
...the President of the Council request the Secretary-General to endeavour to obtain from the USSR Government and the Iranian Government through their representatives and report to the Council at,Its meeting of Tuesday, 2 April, the existing status of negotiations between the two Governments, and particularly to ascertain from the representatives of the two Governments end report whether oqnot the reported withdrawal of troops is conditional upoo the conclusion of agreements between the two Governments on other subjects.lG
Byrnes superficially seemed to be following somewhat the 
earlier proposal of the Australian representative, but Byrnei': 
suggestion was made after the Iranian representative had been 
heard. Byrnes did notwant the presence of Soviet troops In 
Iran to influence the Iranian government In Its dealings 
with the Soviet Union, andcveiLitHt rccomme/isJeJ the withdrawal 
of*Soviet troops, the withdrawal could not be done In a 
substantially shorter period of time thM wae given by the
16. I^., pp# 75-76#
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the Soviet Union for its troop withdrawal* Byraea not oaiy 
wanted the U*S#S.&* to guarantee the evacuation of its 
troops, but also he tried to keep thê  Council away from 
cmieidering the substantive aspects# In the latter case, 
Gromyko’s **absence® aight well constitute a *veto*.
The long-silent‘Càdogan now endorsed the Byrnes proposal*
However, he wanted to change Byme'e' wording from "USSR
.troops oould not be withdrawn from Iran’ih a substantiallya
shorter period® to "the withdrawal of all USSR troops
would not be completed in a substantially shorter period of 
17 -time#® Byraea accepted the Gadogan "amendment,® although18he pointed out that he (Byrnes) had made no "resolution#®
Since the Byr/vss suggestion was based on his own, Hodgson
(Australiâ  quite naturally supported it# But he wanted a
new time limit and suggested either April 3rd or 4th as
19the date for the two parties to reply# Because he had supported 
the Australian proposal earlier, Lange (Poland) now supported
the United States suggestion, end even went so far as to20oongrstulate Byrnes for his resolution# And after an "Alphonsf- 
Gaston* parody between van Bieffens (Hetherl&nde) and Byrnes 
over who had the floor, van Eleffens eventually got around
IT. 76*
18. P. 76,
19. lUl*. PP. 76-77.
20. itia.. p. 78.
to endorsing the Byrnei*' Bueeestlon, Including the April 
2 date*
Byrnes, In reply to Hodgson, Lange, and v&h Kleffens, 
took Issue with the Polish and Australian representative's 
viewpoint on the date the reports were due. April 2 per­
mitted plenty of time, to get the information needed; in 
fact, "That will allow four days, ninety-six hours, ’between
21the adoption of this resolution and the time for the report*
Castillo Zlajera (Mexico) supported the United States
delegate’s view on the date of April 2, but Bonnet (France)22thought that April 3 would be better* He also pointed out 
that the time in Eastern Europe was a day ahead of the time 
in New York, and that time would be needed to decipher 
messages, and so on# Countering this viewpoint, Byrnes re­
marked Î
My good friend from France says that while 29 inarch here today, in Eastern Europe it is 30 î'îaroh* Well, 96 hours from now, on 2 April, it will be 3 April in Moscow* So' my friend get what he wants.23
The discussion had bogged down on a seemingly minor
point# As everyone had to speak hia mind, the delegates
argued for sometime over an issue that could have been settled
quickly by the president had proper rules of order existed*
Even Lange, one of the worst offenders, declared that an
21* P. 79*
22* Ibid.* )?P* 79-80*
23* Ibid.. P. 80*
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that an outside observer vould think that all the Security 
Council talked about were dates. Aa for himself, he pre­
ferred the later date out of courtesy to a member who ^un­
fortunately" was not present, a member who needed more time 
to prepare his case. Very earnestly Lansa pleaded*
How I understand that In court procedure- and we hav̂  many eminent Jurists here, such as the Secretary State of the United States and the representative of Eorpt— It is usually con­sidered policy when the counsel of one of the parties required some time to prepare his brief , to give him that time.24
Perhaps flattered by the remark about his being an eminent
Jurist, Byrnes remarked that If more time were needed when
the reports were due, he thought that It could be allowed*
25  ̂ 'Bedro Lm Velloso (Brazil), spoke up for the first time
to congratulate Byrnes, to say that he had no preference
i t
about the date, and to show the United States that Brazil 26
was on its side. In contrast to Velloso, Hassan Pasha 
talked about a number of things before he got around to 
the main point. He chiefly complimented Byrnes for the
24. ,Ibld.p p. 81.
25. Pedro Leao Velloso (1887-1947) was secretary to the Brazilian delegation to the Parla.peace conference. He 
was secretary-general of the ministry Of foreign affairs, 1941-44 end chairman of the Brazilian delegation to the ÜHCIO, 1945 and the General Assembly and the Security Council, 1946.
26. Security Council Offlolal Records. First Year, First 
Series, Ho, 2,, p. ël.
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good humor of the meeting and because **he reconciled all
the views which we have expressed and put thea Into the 
27right words.^ As for the point of the discourse (the date 
the reports, were due)* Haasan Fasha supported Bonnet * B view.
The "président without further.oonsultlns the members, 
set April 3 ss the date on which the Information from the
disputants vas due on the assumption that the Byrnes suggestion
23
had been unanimously endorsed. But another confusing pro­
cedural issue was brought up by Castillo ::ajera who wanted 
the phrase “I suggest that* taken out Of the paragraph 
that contained suggest that the president of the Security 
Council should request the Secretary-General to endeavour 
to obtain from the USSR Covernment...** Castillo lîajera
29asserted that Byrnes suggestion had becfxne a resolutlœi.
The president then had to correct the idea that the suggestion
had become a résoluticm. It had not. Since no vote bad
been token on Eyrnei*' suggestion (even though it had been
adopted unanimously) it therefore remained a suggestion
' 30and not a resolution. The meeting was then adjourned by the
27* Ibii*. P. 81.
28. Ibid.. p. 82.
29# Ibid.. p. 82.
38."̂ JEkjLâ## p# 82.
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presldcatV'
■ without being either a reeolution or a proposal, the 
Byraea suggestion had taken the force of law in requiring 
the two disputants to turn in" reports by April 3* Here was 
something new in the Council’s procedure, since formerly a 
"suggestion** or a "statement" had been either a "resolution" 
or a "proposal" before it was voted on* In this oase, how­
ever, a "suggestion" served the purpose desired, and no 
argument was made against it.
Ill
The twenty-ninth meeting of the Security Council vas 
held on April 3, and in thia meeting, as in the twenty- 
eighth, the representative of the Soviet Union wasebsent*
At the meeting, the Council concerned itself with the reports 
received by the secretary-general fro® the parties concerned 
in the Iranian dispute*• The president invited Ala to be
31seated and then read a letter fron the secretary-general*
The secretaty-general informed the Council that he
had sent letters to the Iranian and Soviet governments
and had received replies la return* He enclosed a letter
froa Chavaa stating that Ala had been and was now the32accredited representative of Iran* Gromyko a letter stated
31* Ibid* *- *PP# G3"̂ 4*
32* jTbi,d* p P*‘ 64*
that negotlotlane had led to an underatandlne: between Iron
4 ^  *• ‘ l 4»-
and the Soviet Union for the renewed withdrawal of troop*
on flaroh r.4# Gromyko reminded the Coancll thct he had In-
fdrmed It of thia agreement at the tweaty-alxth meeting*
41&*8 letter dealt In a more complex fashion regarding the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran* There had been and *there oould be no negotiations* Instead, ^la Informed the
Council, the Soviet government had presented the Iranlsai
33prime minister with tîiree memoranda* One declared that 
Soviet troops would be withdrawn over a five or six weeks 
period beginning }kirch 24* No ae/vtlon was made of any con­
dition attached to the evacuation* The second memorandum 
dealt with the foF;Msti(?N ol* a joint Iranlan-U.S,S.R* oil 
company, end the third memorandum suggested an autonomous 
Azerbaijan, On condition that no unfomseen circumstances 
should occur, the uovlet embassador to Iran had Informed 
Ghavam orally that the Soviet Union would evacuate Iran 
and Intimated that IT agreement could be reached on the 
second end third memoranda, •‘there would be no further cause 34for anxiety and no unforeeen circumstances would take place*" 
This latter statement had not been clarified by the 
Soviet government, but It seemed clear that the U*S.S*H, was
33# Ibid., pp* 85-66, 
Sÿ. Tbld.. a. 83,
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delajrlns Its eTacuation of troops fran Iran in the hope of 
Induolns Iran to make concessions concerning^ oil and Azer­
baijanian autoncany» Ghavam Informed Ala that Azerbaijan 
was a domestic problem of the Iranian government, and the 
province was regulated by the Iranian constitution and the 
law of provincial councils# The formation of an oil company 
would have to be submitted to the Iranian parliament for 
consideration. îleanwhlle no understanding or agreement had 
been reached But the Iranian government wanted an agree­
ment, at least on the evacuation of Soviet troops, and 
Ala assured the Council)
In closing permit me to repeat that, in 
referring these disputes to the Council, the 
Iranian Government is animated by no feeling 
ci hostility toward the USSR. It is our hope 
that the Council will find a Just solution which 
will promote friendly relations in the future,36
Byrnes wanted to read the Soviet and Ironlan reports, 
but he asked Ala what action should be taken by the Council 
with regard to the questions submitted by his government to 
the Council. Ala replied that if the Soviet Union would 
be willing to withdraw the condition concerning "unforseen 
circumstances" noted in the withdrawal of troops and would 
Giva to the Council a guarantee that Soviet troops would be
35* -Ib.id., p* 86» 
35* Ib id mf P* 8$#
- 9̂  -
ifltMr̂ wa . by JSa;f .6 at thô:latèôt# tbea:Iẑ a vould .not rproea
' 37the.natteroenÿfûrther'̂ ttthl» partloularrtlm@*_ r̂ la van tod* *•
the matter left bn the agenda, however, because he had 
had experience with Soviet dealln£Q before.
Toolve the Cvunoll members time to read the letters and 
reports, the president adjourned the acetlng until the next—' Î
day. This was one of the shortest meetings on the Iranian 
dispute and dealt mostly with the reading of the reports 
from the two disputants. The dlsscuslon of the reports 
would follow In the next meeting, after* they had been read 
and analysed by the members.
XT
The thirtieth meeting of the Security Council opened
at Hintsr College bn April 4, 1946. After the president
had Invited Ala to take his place at the Council table,
Byrnes offered a draft resolution for the consideration-
of the Council. Els was the most Important eIngle notion
to be made since the re-submlttence of the dispute to the
Council. Ihe complete text of the resolution read!
The Security Council.
Tnhinr. note of the eta ten in ts by the 
Iranian représentative that the Iranian appeal to the Council arises from the presence of CSSE troops In Iran and their continued presence there bcyohd the date stipulated for their with­
drawal In the Trl-partite Treaty of 29 January 1942;
37# mS.*é P# 87#
Taking note of the replies dated 3 April of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iranian Government pursuant 
to the request of the Secretary-General for Infor­mation as to the state of the negotiations betvreen 
the two Governments and as to whether the with­drawal of USSR troops from Iran Is conditional uppQ agreement on other subjects;
And In particular taking note of and relying upon the assurances of the USSR Government:
That the withdrawal of USSR troops from Iran has already commenced;
That It Is the intention of the USSR Gov­ernment to proceed with the withdrawal of Its troops as rapidly as possible;
That the USSR Government expects the with­drawal of all USSR troops frcwithe whole of Iran to be completed within five or six weeks; and
That the proposals under negotiation between the Iranian Government and the USSR Government are not connected with the withdrawal of USSR troops;
Being solicitions to avoid any possibility of the presence of USSR troops In Iran being used to influence the course of the negotiations be­tween the Governments of Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and
Reco.gnl̂ lng that the withdrawal of all USSR troops from the whole of Iran cannot be completed in a substantially shorter period of time that within which the USSR Government has declared it to be its intention to complete such withdrawal;
Resolvea that the Council defer further proceedings of the Iranian appeal until 6 Kay> at which time the USSR Government and the Iranian Govemiaent are requested to report tĉ he Council whether the withdrawal of all USSR troops from the whole of Iran has been oaapleted and at which time the Council shall consider what. If any, further proceedings aâ the Iranian appeal are required;
w  I*
Provided, however, that If In the meantime either the USSR Government or the Iranian Gov-* ernment or any member of the Security Ĉ unoll reporta to the Secretary-General any develop­ments which may retard or threaten to retard the prompt withdrawal of USSR troops froa Iran̂In accordance with the assurances uf the USSR to the Cĉ jtncll, the Secretary-General shall Immediately call to the attention of the Council such reports, which shall be considered as the 
first Item on the a&enda.5&
After congratulatins Ike £reatpowers In letting Iran
state Its case and In keeping the question on the agenda
In case something went Wrong with the negotiations. Hassan
39Pasha endorsed the resolution* He coamended the U#G*5#R*
for complying with the decision of the Security Council
by submitting Its report on April 3# Velloso (Brazil)
agreed with Byrneŝ  proposal, and he complimented the Council
for doing Its duty In hearing the case and inviting the40Iranian representative to sit with the Council* In support­
ing the Resolution,Cadogan went along with the last two 
members* He thought that were the resolution adopted, the
Council would be taking the first step towards a peaceable41
end amicable settlement of the dispute* Even the Polish
35. Itia.. pp.88-89.
39. m a ., p. 90.
40. Ibid.. pp. 90-91»
41. lÈil., p. 91.
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representative (Lanse) agreed with the resolution*
Xt 8003 becaiae apparent that all the members wanted to
say a few words about the resolution and about things In
general* There was a feeling In the air, as when the
Bevla resolution was adopted, that the Council soon would
be done with the Iranian «question, and that it had done Its
duty towards Iran*
Predicting thftt the Council was on the “right road**
and It must keep on this road to achieve a lasting peace,
Castillo Najera (Kexlco) hoped that in the future all
members of the Council, permanent or non-permenent, would
unite In their efforts to secure the peaceful settlement 
43of disputes* Bonnet (France) supported the Byrnes proposal
and observed that the Security Council not only had done
Its duty but also that the differences of opinion Battled44by the Council were over matters of procedure*
Now was heard the first and only discordant note InV
this happy atmosphere* Hodgson (Australia) said that 
Australia stood for tlie principle that the Council should 
make no decision without a careful, orderly, and methodical 
examination of all the facts end Information relating to 
the dlGpute.80 89 to enable the Council to act “as a high
42, Ibid.. pp* 91-92*
43. Ibid.. P, 92*
44* Ibid.* pp. 92-93.
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45Jtidiclal tribunal would &ot#" Slaoe It covered only the
evacuation of Soviet troops from 1#̂ an Ian soil, and did not
refer to the other evidences of Soviet interference In the
Internal affairs of Iran, Bjmnk* resolution was a hasty one.
The Council, indeed, had gone straight from discussing a
procedural question of postponenent to a final resolution
without ever having decided to Investlgete the real dispute.
Sot at any time had the Cj'uncll heard complete statements
froa either disputent. He brought the absence of the
Soviet representative Into his argument when he said:
We deprecate the fact that the represent-*atlve of the USSR left the Council during dla*-' eussions of procedural questions and beforo the facts or merits of the case vez*e even discussed, thus prejudicing the work, the efficiency and the authority of the Counc11,46
Hodgson further contended that the arrangements made outside
the Council had lowered the prestige and weakened the authority
of the Council, He declared that he would abstain la any
Vote on the Uymes resolution, and he reserved the right
to call for a complete investigation If the clrcumstancea
47warranted It at any time. No one eei^ously contested 
Hodgson̂ s argument, tut It was apparent, however, that he
45# Ibid,. J?. 95# 
46, Ibid., p. 95, 
47# IbM .̂ P# 95,
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approached the puhetantlve aspect of the questloa and 
Ignored the wishes of the big powers, especially the United 
States and the United Kingdoa, to avoid entangling them­
selves, Iran, and the Security Council with the Soviet 
Union** use of the "veto." Both van Kieffens and Quo 
Tai-Ohl appreciated the Hodgson position, but they thought 
that there was no us© In dealing with difflo%(_JLtiGS which 
did not need to be discussed or solved and that executive
meeting, private meetings held- outside the Council,
A3helped to smooth things out# This was ©specially helpful
In procedural matters* and nothing in the Charter prevented
these meetings, nor did It say anything about all Council
meetings being held in public#
A vote was now taken and the resolution passed with
A9nine votes in favor and one abstention (Australia)# Ala
expressed his thanks, but he wanted It understood, however*
that the question should remsla bn the agenda end could50be brought up for consideration at any tise*
V
’ In the twenty-seventh meeting, the Iranian represent­
ative, Ala, when seated at the Council t&ble said much the 
same a* his predecessor, Taqizsdeh# The complaint was the
48. Ibld.f pp.' 95-96,
49. Ibid;, Pt 97.
50. Ibid.,- PP. 97-99.
Bam«t that Soviet troops were still In Iran, that Soviet 
Intervention la Iranian affairs oontinned, and that no 
results had been achieved from attempted negotiations,
Co the other hand* with the U.5*S*R* representative absent 
from the Council, Lange the Polish delegate, presented the 
Soviet case. He followed the Soviet line that there had 
been negotiations between the disputants and that results 
had been achieved,
Ala was asked several times to limit his remarks to 
procedural matters and not involve the Council In a dis­
cussion of the substantive aspect of the question, Byrnes 
and fluo Tai-Chl were especially insistent about this because 
of their fear of a Soviet "veto** on a substantive If&ue.
Gromyko’s absence was referred to only a few times, 
end, although Hodgson (Australia) once pointedly remarked 
about the absence, no one else took it up. However, when 
the Soviet delegate met the April 3 deadline. In conformance 
with the Council request, many observers were suprlsed, and 
it was hoped that the United Hâtions In the future might 
have even more control over the policies of a great p<wer.
In assuming the leadership of the anti-Sbvlet bloc, 
Byrnes carried on much of the discussion and was the dominant 
personality in the Council’s hearing of the Iranian dispute. 
In trying to meet the Soviet Union halfway by not rushing
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the withdrawal of Its troops, ha avoided the substantive 
aspect of the question. During the aeetlng and after the 
adoption of the Byrnes resolution, optimism prevailed, 
since all that the Soviet- representative had to do was to 
drop the phrase "unforseen circumstances," end the Iranian 
delegate would be satisfied.
After expressing his appreciation for the adoption 
of his resolution, Byrnes referred b the committee of experts 
which then was drafting a set of rules for Council pro­
cedure. The Council must not become a "slave** to any 
particular method of accomplishing the objective of the 
Charter, JUâ*» the maintenance of world peace. He expressed 
the viewpoint of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of keeping fluid 
both written constitutions and written laws. The Soviet 
viewpoint on the other hand, was to be found In Gromyko’s 
insistence on the strictest interpretation of the Charter 
as it was written, and not to have It changed by unwritten 
rules of practice or usuage.
While the rest of: the Council was content to leave 
negotiations to the parties concerned and was satisfied 
with the information the parties chose to report, Hodgson 
wanted to investigate very throughly the facts of the case.
In spite of the arguments of the rest of the Council, the 
Australien delegate maintained his viewpoint throughout 
the discussions.
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The Iranian representative realized that ho would 
have to accept just about anything that the Council had to 
offer* Therefore he waa pleased to see the majority of 
the Council support the Byrnes resolution and the question 
remain on the agenda* Rowever, Byrnes* resolution touched 
on only one aspect of the Iranian ccsaplaint, tx'oop evacuation* 
and not on Soviet Intervention In Iranian Internal affairs*
In this respect the Council avoided the issue, as the 
Australian representative Intimated* It was thought by 
some members that if the troops were withdrawn. Inter* 
ventIon In Internal affairs would ceaee. The Byrnes re­
solution was looked upon as perhaps the necessary step 
to settle the question and maintain world peace*
- loi -
CHAPTER 5*
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IRANIAH CCî̂îPLAlirr
i.
The thirty-first meetln? of the Security Couacll with 
Gromyko In attendance* was held ot Hunter College on April 
9f 194S# It was originally Intended at this neetlng GNly 
to draft provisional rules of procedure as revised by the 
Council’s committee of experts, tut after the adoption of 
these rules* the president* Quo Ta1-Chi (China), brought 
up the Iranian questloh# After stating that there were 
two letters In his possession from the disputants In the 
Iranian case* the president remarked thit he also had two
fcommunications from the Polish representative relative to
. 1the SpanlfihTquestion* Having: presented the provisional 
rule of procedure that the Council had to have three days’ 
notice'"before It could meet to dlsdusa new communications, 
the president referred to the Council’s emergency power 
and said that the Council could meet at any time*
Cadogan brought up rule S of the Security Council 
procedure 5
The provisional agenda, for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives on the Security Council at 
least three days before the meeting, but In urgent clxvsumstances It may be communicated 2simultaneously with the notice of the meeting*
1* Security Council Official Records. First Year, First Series, Supplement 2îo*2,* Hunter College* the Bronx,
Hew York* pp* 46-47#
2, pecuritv Council Official Records* First Year, First Series, Ho*2*. Hunter College, York, (25 îîarch 1946 
to 26 June 1946), p* 108*
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Since the Iranian question was still cm the agenda, would
the CouzKSil have to put the letters from the U*B*S«R« and
Iran on the agenda formally, or would they already be cm
the agenda, was Cadogan’s inquiry. The president thought
that the Soviet and Iranian letters dealt with a matter
already on the agenda but that the Polish letters were ne&
material and would require three dayŝ  notice,
After hearing Byrnes statement in which he said, "In
response to the president's inquiry as to the pleasure of
the Council regarding the time of the next meeting, I
wish to make clear that I am preparedto speak for the
United States on these subjects at any time, now, tonorrow,
or three days frc«i now," the president decided to hold the4next meeting at 3 p*m, the next afternoon»
Of the opiniCHfi that an emergency meeting should not
be held unless it were really on emergency meeting. Bonnet
(France) wanted the president's oplhion as to the exact
status of the meeting called for the next day. The president
qualified himself by saying that the meeting was, ",. .not
exactly an emergency meeting, but me on matters concerning
5urgent circumstances," The president's first suggestion to
3, m m . #  P* 119,
4, Ibid.. p, 3L20, 
5,. Ibid,  ̂p, 120,
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have the eecretary-general notify the Coimoll when the 
next meeting would be was the most acceptable to Velloso 
(Brazil), At this point* Cadogan pointed out that the 
Council had just now adopted rule 8 and within a few minutes
7had pRoceded to break It*
Taking a firm stand on his proposal to have the Iranian 
question discussed the next day* the president maintained 
that If the question were not discussed then it could not 
be hntll the next week, as circumstances forbade it. But 
he got little help In trying to decide a date for the
I* <next meeting* except* suprisingly enough* from Gromyko who 
said* “If the Security Council considers that Fflday is a 
suitable day for the consideration of this question* I am 
prepared to agree; If the Council considers Saturday a
suitable day* I am prepared to agree upon Saturday; If any8other day Is suggested, I am prepared to agree#* The 
Egyptian delegate suggested Saturday at 10 or 11 a.m#, 
but the president* now more than a little piqued* ignored 
HasBan Pasha completely and said that the secretary-general 
would notify the Council when the next meeting would be#
He then adjourned the meeting#
8# -lbid# * p # 120#
7. Ifeiâ.» p. 121.
6* Itld# a p« 121#
9 .  2 S M .»  p .  1 2 2 .
- 104 r
The letters referred to by the président were from>■
Grmyko (April 6) sad Ala (April 9), Ala's letter merely
consisted of an acknowledgment of the Soviet letter sent
to Ala by the secfetary-generai* The situation in Iran
remained the same* i.e.. nothing had changed, and the10negotiations bad accmpliahed nothing new,
* ?'In his letter to the president, Gromyko denounced
as Illegal the resolution of April 4 which gave Iran until
"' , 5 ■ 11May $ to report on the progress of the situation. Again
citing Article 34, Gromyko flarly asserted that no threat
. . ' 1to world peace existed and that an understanding had been 
reached regarding the withdrawal of troops• As he had done 
in the March 18 meeting, he again requested that the Iranian 
question be removed from the agenda. Although the Soviet 
letter was no more than a restatement of Soviet policy, it 
should be noted that the letter vîas dated April 6, four 
days before Gromyko said, he would discuss the question.
By bringing up th® matter before the 10th, and during his 
absence from the jOounoll, the Soviet delegate contradicted
himself, since he had said that under no circumstances could
'!he discuss the q|Uest,ion before April 10.
The discussIdn, over setting a date for the next meeting/ ' "/ i \
well demonstrated .how the 0wine 11 often found itself involved
'f /in prolonged ajnd nontindal bickering over apparently trivial
r A10. Security Offlolal ReooNs. First Year, FirstSeries, Supplemoî t ,No, 2*, pp, 4o--47*
11. Ibid.. pp \46-47.
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prooedurel'fd̂ oblems. At the same time, hoifever. It must be 
remembered that the'Oouneil was settlmg; Important precedents,
precedent* that would determine Its procedure for years■>
to oome* Moreover, and most significantly, the delate In 
the thirty-first meeting, although apparently settling nothing. 
Bay well have changed the entire outcome of the Iranian 
dispute* For within a week, another Iranian letter was 
to explode like a bomb in the Security Council and outdate 
Entirely the Gromyko and Ala letters mentioned in this meeting*
II
The'thirty-second meeting of the Security Council was
not held until April 15 as the president had warned# The
president immediately proceeded to road a'letter from the
Iranian representative which caused consternation among12the Council members# Ala wrote that his government had 
Instructed him to make the following statement#
As a result of the signature of the agreement between the Iranian Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, It has been agreed that the Red Amy evacuate all rerSian territory by 6 2lay 1946# The Iranian Government has no d-ubt that this agreement will be carried out, but at the samC' time has not the right to fix the course the Security Council should take#̂ 3
12# Security Cou.-icil Official Records. First Year, First Series, 3o#2#, pp#:322-123#
13# Ibid.. p# 123#
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Th« Iranian representative Included In hla letter the text 
of a telegram he had received that mornings
In view of the fact that the USSR Ambassador 
had again today» 14 April, categorically reiterated that the uncondltl<%ial evacuation of Iranian terr­itory by the Red Army will be completed by 6 I4ay 1946, It la necessary that you Imnedately Infora the Security Oouncll that the Iranian Gô x̂ rnrnent 
has complete trust In the word and pledge of the USSR Government and for this reason withdraws Its complaint from the Security Gouncll*14
This shocking statement set off a heated discussion 
that soon was to involve the question of the Security Council*# 
right to control Its own agenda, a statement by the secretary- 
general that questioned the Security Council's jurisdiction 
In the Iranian dispute, a second Soviet walkout, sl momentary 
split between Poland end the U.S*S.R., en alignment of 
Trance with Poland and the Soviet Union, ea well ae bitter 
debate among the members.
Aa soon as the president finished, Gromyko, In an
acid **I told you so" mood, oondemmed the Council for taking
action on the Iranian case after the Soviet Union had told
15the Council that an agreement had been reached. The U#3#S*R* 
oould not disregard lightly the decision taken on April 4 
during the absence of the ôviet delegation. Agreeing that 
the Council's action would have been justified were the
14. Ibid,,'p. 123.
15. Ibid.. pp. 123-126,
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situation In Iran a threat to world peace, Gronylio called
the Council*a attention to the "eztrocely lâ ortant fact*
that the Cecùrity Council could not lake action on a dls:̂ te
unle&B loth parties concerned were heard. And Gronyko vas
not present when the resolution of April 4 %os adopted#
(Groajko seeneJ to forget that he was a party of the dispute,
that he had been hoard often chough, and that hie absence
was entirely voluntary)#
Questioning the legality of hairing the dispute on
the agenda, aa Vyshinsky had done before hln Gromyko pointed
out that the Covlet Union had so legitimate and substantial
a case that ̂ vca the Iranian goi/emment now had wlthdrâ m
Its complaint# In positive words he asserted th6tthe task
Of the Council now was to *h'ote* the removal of the Iranian16.question from the agenda* Everything else had been settled 
and all that reaaincd to terminate the formal aspects of 
the I Iranian complalrit was to ”note*’lts removal.
/dthough he was "naturally* pleased to learn of the 
agreement between the disputants, Stfrttinlus, who had 
replaced Lymes In the Council, asserted thot the April 4
17action in the Council was legal and proper# (He quoted 
17. Itl).. pp. 126-127,
* •  10̂  **
11Article 2p paragraph 4 of the Charter to support his argument)* 
Confronting Gromyko with the two reasons why the Council had 
acted as It did on April 4* Stettlnlus declared, that the 
Council had accepted not only the assurances of the U»S.5.R. 
that It would withdraw Its troops froa Iran but also the 
willingness of the Iranian government to accept these assur­
ances*
In direct opposition to Grœnyko* Stettinlus saw no
reason why the Iranian question should be taken off the
agenda until 2îay 6 when the Iranian report was due as prowled
In the April 4 resolution* He hoped that on I lay 6* If the
report from Iran were favorable, the question could be
19 - 'dropped fràta the founoll agenda* Gtettlniua suspected that
Iran’s sudden reversal resulted from pressure placed on the
Iranian govemmeat by either Soviet authorities In Iran
of by the continued presence of Soviet troops* He prefared
a "wait and see" policy*
Van Kleffena also defended the Council action of
April 4 and objected to dropping the Iranian case from the
18, Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United ITatlons Charter;"All Kembera In order to ensure to all of then the rights «bd benefits resulting from membership, SJé/tlL fulfil 
good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter*"
19# Security Council̂  Officiel Records. First Year, First 
Series,
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20agenda# Cadogan, too, by supporting the legality of the
Council action, denied Gromyko's arguments for dropping
the matter from the agenda. As usual, Cadogan backed the
United States and again demonstrated the solidarity of21opinion between the two governments on this question.
Insisting that he would not agree to the removal of
the question fram the agenda until a report had been received
from the Iranian representative on I!ay 6, Hodgson maintained
that the decision of the majority of the Council had been
fully In line with the Charter# He also wondered what
had happened to the first part of the original Iranian
ooaplalnt, l.e.̂ the Interference of Soviet authorities In
Iranian Internal affairs. Since no mention had been made
of this In the Iranian request for the removal of Its
complaint from the agenda, he wanted to know whether this
also had been settled# He summed up the position of the
members opposing the dropping of the question by saying*
Statements by one or another Individual member of the Council do not absolve the Councilfrom its duty to Investigate and to decideascertained facts#22
20, Ibid., pp# 127-128#
21# Ibid.. pp# 128-120#
22# Ibid.. p# 122#
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" ’fthile â£reelne that the losloal thine to Co would
be to drop the case frosi Uie agenCa In the Xi£ht of the
present oirouiastances, Velloso (Brazil) thought another
23matter had to be considered that prevented this action*
This was whether the Council had control over itJ own agenda, 
or whether the parties to a dispute could cases from
the Council at will# ArS^ing that the authority of the 
Council was at stake, Velloso contended that the Council 
oould decide Its own agenda, and he opposed the withdrawing 
Of the question foi? that reason#
Thwarted in vbat seemed to be his aoment of victory, 
Gromyko fouglit back vigorously* He pointed out again and 
again tliat both Iran and the Soviet Union wanted the matter 
dropped from the agenda, and the Council had no right to 
oppose this view* The United States and the United Kingdom 
once had kept the question on the agenda because no agree­
ment had been reached, and now that an agreement had been 
reached, they still opposed the deletion of the question 
from the agenda* Here, Indeed, was the type of inconsistent 
attitude which could undermine the prestige of the Council* 
Gromyko also as se fted that the Dutch end Australian attitudes
23. Ibid.. pp. 132-133.
24. II'là.. P.à. 133-154,
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were IncoQpatltld with "the meantOG and letter of the
2̂5Charter of our Organization*"
There now appeared the first major split In the anti-
Soviet hloo. Bonnet (France) wearied of two hours of
•somewhat complicated discussions," proposed that the case
be dropped and that the secretary-general report on any
further developments, in accordance with Article 99 of the 
25
Charter, The deletion of the question from the agenda would 
be the simplest and least complicated method of solving 
the discussion, and anyway the Council had fulfilled ita 
committsionta to Iran#
Agreeing with the French representative only to the 
extent of ending the discussion, Castillo Bajera (Jîexico) 
brOw.ght up his favorite point. I.e.. that the small countries 
were reassured that a favc^able Impression upon public 
opinion the world over had been created by the Council*»27ectloh on the Iranian case. Therefore, he would vote for 
the malnt&A//wrof the April 4 resolution,
Lange wanted to be put on record aa sharing the view 
that the Council action of April 4 was legal, and this he28
separated himself, on that Issue, from Gromyho, Even so,
t
25, Ibid,, p. 134,
26, Article 99 of the United Nations Charterr Sec­retary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion nay threateii the 
maintenance of international peace and security,"
27, Security Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Series, 4̂0«2,, pp, 13——137,
26, Ibid., p, 137,
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In view of the circumstances, Lan̂ e thought that theI
question now should be dropped from the agenda. Since the
Council would not renounce completely Its Jurisdiction over
the question, the secretary-general could refer the matter
to the Council at any time. Lange cited Article whereby
parties can settle their disputes peacefully outside the
United nations, and argued that the Council }iad no cause
to interfere In the settlement and "create trouble between
29the two parties." Lange upheld the doctrine that a country 
had the right to withdraw its case from the Security Council20
whenever it wished, and in this he followed the Soviet line* 
But he would not admit that the Council action of April 4 
was illegal, since he had voted for It. Cn this issue, 
he was io a difficult position. Bad he condemned the action 
as illegal, as had Gromyko, ho would have admitted supportlî g 
an illegal act and further demonstrated Polandsubjection 
to the Soviet Union.
31After Lange had finished his outburst, Afifl Pasha,
29é Ibid.. pp. 138-139. 
30. Ibid.. p. 139.
31. Hafez. Afifl Pasha, M.D. was a former member fif the Itbsral constitutional party and political froat in Egypt.
Ho vfnB ambassador,to London and negotiated the treaty of 
alliance with the United Kingdom in 1936. He was former minister for foreign affairs and was representative to the 
Security Council and the Atomic Energy eommlsslon in 1946*
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now repre#enting Zgypt In place of Haeean Pasha, endorsed
the view* Of the representatives of the United States,
the United Kingdom̂  the Netherlands, Brazil, and Mexico#
 ̂̂ ̂ Gromyko, Stettlnlua and Cadcgan now Involved themselves
in what almost amounted to a name-calling contest* Crcmyko
tlfttiy asserted that Stettlnlus* proposal to keep the question
cm the agenda violated the Charter and Infringed upon the
sovereign rights of the United ITatlons members* He store
that Intimated that the United States end the United Kingdom
did not with to settle the differences betueen the U#S.S*R*
and Iran, andhe accused both Stettlnlus and Cadogan of
32using Iran as a "pawn" In the game of world politico*
Tired of listening to approximately three hours of
bickering, the president proposed adjournment* But Stettlnlus,
angered by the Soviet tirade against hlmoclf and Cadogan,
wanted to reply to Gromyko* In a rather disgusted and tired
manner, he contended that he had n^t made ony proposal
tN. this particular afternoon; he merely had attempted to
e:î laln why the United States could not ouuport the reouest
33put before the Cot̂ ncll by the U.S*E*R* representative*
w *
31# Security S :unc"l CTflclel Records, rirst ïear. First Series, :Jo,2,, p, 135.
32, pp. 139-141.
33. p. 141.
Gromyko was not let off eo easily by Cadogan, who 
was fighting mad at the Implication that the United States 
and the United Zlngdon were not genuinely Interested In 
aettllng the Iranian matter# Gromyko was entirely wrong#
At all times both the United States and the United JClngdcxa 
had worked to solve ••this thing!* The resolution of April 4 
was such a solution* If the Soviet government had carried 
out the assurances given to the Council by the Soviet delegate# 
the Iranian question would not have come up agdln# After 
all# It was Gromyko who had brought up the question again 
In demanding that the Council rescind Its own resolution*
Ead Gromyko left veil enough alone# the Council would have 
heard nothing more about the Iranian question* The president 
abruptly'adjourned the meeting before fiiore replies or comments 
could be made*
In this thirty-second meeting a most Important matter 
aroset whether or not the Security Council was master of its 
own agenda# In the opinion of the Soviet bloc# the state 
bringing the dispute to the Council at Its own discretion# 
oould withdraw at will Its complaint# The antl-Govlet bloc 
argued that the Council had every right to regulate the develop 
ment of a dispute brought before It* If the Council had the 
right to place a dispute on its agenda# It had an equal right 
to say where It should be removed trm the agenda* Here was
34# Ibid*# p# 141.
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a conetltutloneLl question of great importance* Sven though 
It can be assumed that had Stettlnlus and Cadogan wanted 
to remove the Iranian question from the agenda, they would 
have done so. It was fortunate for the Security Council that 
a majority of the members if even for practical reasons, 
opposed the Soviet viewpoint and thus sustained the autonomy 
of the new United Nations,
The thirty-second meeting also revealed a weakening 
in the solidarity of the two blocs. The French representative 
momentarily supported the Soviet position, even though 
Bonnet never accepted the Soviet reasoning behind that position 
He wanted to dispose of the Iranian question in the most 
convenient manner possible, though he wanted aacurances that 
it could be brought back to the Council under Article 99# 
if need be. Lange, too, departed though in a minor respect, 
from a party line laid down by Gromyko* He hardly could 
argue that the April 4 resolution was Illegal, since he had 
voted for it. In spite of these two departures, the other 
members of the two blocs stood firm, and thus the alignment 
in the Security Council on the Iranian question was the 
U.S.S.R, (with Polish backing) versus the U.S.A. and Great 
Britain (with Egyptian, Dutch, Australian, Erazlallan, Chinese, 
and Mexican backing).
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 ̂ Gromykoattempt to hmlllate the Counoll by forcing 
It to rescind Its action of April 4 failed completely* Instead, 
the anti-Soviet bloc determined the course of action and 
Gromyko’s hopes came to naught# The Iranian government’s
s • —f
sudden reversal generally vas regarded by the anti-Soviet 
nations merely aa an expression of Soviet pressure on Ghavam.
"Watch and va it" and no retreat became the anti-Soviet♦
bloc’s attitude* ,The U*S«5*a# would have to keep ; 
faith in withdrawing its troops from Iran*
The strong language, insults, and recrimination̂  of 
the Council members in this meeting were abruptly ended by 
the president’s adjournment* But the extreme divergence 
of views over whether the parties to a dispute oould with-
k i
draw the dispute from the Council was to continue on into 
the next meeting and widen the cleavage between cast and 
vest*
III
*' The thirty-third meeting of the Security Council met 
on April l5f 1946 to continue the discussion of the Iranian 
question* Bonnet, In the meanwhile, had drawn up a draft
35resolution and had had it circulated among the members*
The French delegate’s draft resolution now read By the 
president of the Council, re-stated what Bonnet had said 
earlier* The secretary-general should collect information 
to complete the Security Council’s report to the General
35. Ibid*, pp* 142-143*
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Agaembly on the Iranian ease, and the question then shouldIK *
be î ropped froa the Council a&enda*
After reading Bonnet’s draft resolution̂  the president ̂ 36
reported on a memorandum from Trygve Lie* the secretary'*
37general of the united Ẑ atlone# Arguing that It was desirable
for him to present his official viewpoint* Lie summarized
the history of the Iranian case In so far as It applied to
the articles of Chapter 6 of the Charter# He concluded that;
*.*following withdrawal by the Iranian represent­
ative* the question Is automatically removed from 
the agenda* unless;
(a) The Security Council votes an Investigation 
under Article 34* or(b) A Member brings It up as a situation or dis­
pute under Article 35* or(c) ‘ The Council proceeds under Article 36* para­graph 1* which would appear to require a preliminary 
finding that a dispute exists under Article 33*Qor that there is *a situation of like nature
' Furthermore* Lie argued that since the Council had 
neither Invoked Articles 34 and 35* paragraph 1 nor decided 
that a dispute existed under Article 33* **lt may well be
3̂9there Is no way In which It can remain seized of the matter#
n
36. Trygve n# Lie (1896- ) escaped to England with the
HorwêGfan government In 1940 and was acting forelg; minister 
for Norway ( In England), 1940-45# fie evolved provision*! measures that saved the HorwOejan n̂ eet for the Allies#. J/V 1945 he was chairman of the NorwôaXan delegation to the üàICIO and chairman of the Horw^Gyan delegation to the J&eneral 
Assembly* 1946# Also In 1946* he was elected secretary- 
general of the United (fatlcms#
7ïé Security Council Official Recordŝ  First Year* First 
Series* :Jo#2.f PP# 143-145#
38̂  Ibli#* p# 144#
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The eeoretaty-^eneral used his legal right as adviser
to the Seourlty Counoll to present his vle%s# In doing
so he added prestige to his office when^In a critical moment»
he chose to make his power f%t# But In questioning the
legality of the Council** action In the thirty-second meeting»
he directly sustained the Bovlet position and weakened the
anti-Soviet bloc In the Council*
After Inquiring If It were agreeable to the rest of
the Council» the president referred the Lie memorandum to
the committee of experts for examination and report# The
committee*8 report should he made before Comcll action on
the memorandum# Gromyko» naturally enr̂ mgh» supported
the president# The others were silent# The president set
April 18 for the report of the committee#
The Council then got to work on the adjourned business
of the last meeting# Stettlnlua answered Gromyko** charges
41with accusations of his own# Membership on the Council
carried with It tremendous responsibilities» and Gromyko
had not lived up to these responsibilities* On the other»
hand* both “Secretary of State Byrnes and I have scrupulously
refrained from questioning the motives of any Member» aik3
I shall therefore not pursue this aspect of the matter any 42further**#" Stettlnlus reiterated: that the Council action
40; Ibid.. p# 145#
41# Ibid.. pp# 145-146#
42. Itia.. p. 145*
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Of April 4 was legal; that It was unwiee to drop the 
(question frort the agenda; that the continued presence of 
Soviet troope In Iran might have bad something to do with 
the sudden reversal in Iranian oplnlm; and that the Iranian 
question oould be disposed of under the resolution of llaS 6^ 
if on that date* Iran bad no more complaints#
Gromyko oounter-*attaoked# ,Ke had "called things by*
their proper names* regardless of whether Mr. Stettlnlus
43agreed with me or not*" he said* Since both Byrnes and
Stettlnlus earlier had opposed the removal of the Iranian
question because no agreement had been reached* their
"Inconsistency, and lack of logic" was demonstrated because*
now that agreement had been reached* they still opposed
dropping the question from the agenda#
Breaking into the Stcttlaius-Groayko quarrel* the
Retherlanda delegate said that the issue* in its simplê T
terms* was* "Who is master of the Council’s agenda#**It
Is not the parties* but the Council that admits a question
to the agenda; not the parties but the Council alone that 44
can remove It*" Speaking as the representative of China*
and not as president. Quo Tai-Chl supported the Netherlands
view* But when* In his presidential capacity* he asked
43, Ibid.. p. 147.
44. Ibid.. p. 147.
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for a vote on the «ovlet proposal, both. Lange and Bonnet
raised a point of order arguing that the Council could
not vote until It had received the report of the concaltteo 
45of experts# Reluctantlŷ  the president concurred and
postponed the vote#
A bitter altercation then broke out between the president
and Gromyko when Gromyko harshly condemned Quo Tal-Chl for
disregarding the seoretary-general’s mémorandum and his
own (Quo tal-Clhl*s) earlier ruling In sending the memorandum46to the CŒurnlttee of experts# The president lamely defended
himself by saying that he had forgotten about the memorandum,
but he did recall that In the thirty-second meeting Gromyko *
had agreed to a vote# The meeting was then adjourned#
17
In attempting to remove Its complaint from the Council 
agenda, Iran brought up a completely new problem for the 
Council to solve: If the Gecurlty Council was to be master
of its own agenda# If the states party to a dispute could
withdraw their complaints at will, the prestige and power 
of the Council would be greatly undermined# An Issue of 
precedent of great importance wos thus raised* The members
45# Ibid.. pp# 149-150#
45# Ibid#, pp. 150-151#
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of the Council, la taking sides on this question, aJhered to 
the saae general line aa before the presentation of the new 
Iranian request# Those mambers (with the exception of France), 
who previously had voted to retain the question on the agenda, 
still wished to do so# The Council, therefore, was master 
of Its own agenda* On the other hand, those who had voted. 
against the Inclusion of the Iranian complaint on the agenda, 
still wanted It removed# The Council, therefore, was not 
master of Its own agenda# And though the Issue remained 
undecided at the end of the thirty-third meeting. It was 
clear that the antl-Sovlet bloc, opposed by only the U.S.S.R., 
France, and Poland, would write its view Into the procedural 
law of the Council#
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CHAPTER 6*
THE INDEFINITE PCSTFONmSNT 
OF THE IRANIAN QUESTION
JL
The thlrty-Blxth meeting of the Security Council was 
held m  April 23» 1946; Afifl Pasha (Egypt), the new preŝ
ident reminded the Gounoll of the postponement of discussion
/on the Iranian question until the committee of eaçperta had 
reached a decision and had submitted a report. The committee 
had submitted a report, but It had not reached a unanimous 
decision. What was to be done now?
Gromyko started the discussion by trying to accommodate 
the 8ecretary~general*8 memorandum to his own views. The 
committee*8 failure to reach a unanimous decision, he said, 
only relected the division in the Council, Because the 
memorandum was. an impartial analysis of the legal aspects 
of the question, the Council could not now prevent Iran 
from withdrawing its complaint from the agenda. Had the 
Council acted under the various articles of Chapter 6, Iran 
could not remove Its complaint. But the Council had not 
acted under the various articles of Chapter 6, (largely, it 
must be remembered because of Gromyko's implied threat of using 
the "veto" should the substantive aspect be- considered),
1, Security Counoll Officiai Records. First Year, First 
Series, No, 2,, Hunter College, New York, (25̂ îarch 1946 to 26 June 1946), p, 102,
2, Ibid., pp, 201-203.
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Iranian dispute must be removed from the agenda. The 
contrary United States view was wrong, inconsistent and 
illogical.
Denying Gromj'-ko's charges of inconsistency, Stettinius
said that he was unable to agree with the conclusions of
3the secretary-general. If these conclusions were accepted, 
they would seriously limit the Council’s power. Since he 
understood that Bonnet’s resolution (to remove the Iranian 
question from the agenda) was procedural in character and 
thus would reverse the resolution of April 4, Stettinius 
was definitely opposed to it.
Hodgson at this moment tried to apply one of the 
articles of Chapter 6 to the Iranian dispute. Since the 
situation was dangerous enough to warrant the Council’s 
keeping the question on the agenda, he argued. Article 34 
made the Security Council "the watchdog for the whole of the 
United Nations."^ He had his doubts about the "agreement" 
referred to in the Iranian statement, and he wanted the 
question to be kept on the agenda,^
To defend his resolution in the face of Stettinius’ 
attack. Bonnet reiterated his idea that the Coundil already 
had done its duty toward Iran. His resolution in no way
3. Ibid.. pp. 203-206.
4# Ibid., pp. 204—206.
5. Ibid., p. 204.
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6limited the Counoll s powers over the Iranlas question*
It merely reoognlzed the conciliatory aspects of an agreement 
reached by bilateral negotiations* The United étions, stood 
for peace# and whether that peace were secured by Council 
action or negotiationswas Irrelevant.
F #
Cadogan asserted that the Charter neither explicitly
permitted a party to withdraw its complaint not explicitly
permitted the Council to control its own agenda. In direct
opposition to Gromyko*6 conclusion that the lack of unanimity
la the committee report was "regrettable#* Cadogan thought
that it was well that# on so abstract an Issue# the tech-
nlcal conmittee had not laid down a general rulè to govern7the Council in all eases, Ccomon sense was necessary in 
interpreting the Charter, Two more divergent viewpoints 
(that those of Gromyko and Cadogan) could hardly be found#
r
and once again revealed the disparity between the Anglo-
Saxon and Russian Interpretations of a written document,
While the Polish representative once again came out
8 9in support of the French resolution, Rafael de la Collna;
Ibid PP. 205—207*
7, Ibid.. PP, 207-208,1
8, Ibid.. pp. 208-210,
9, Rafael de la Collna (1898- ) became a council to various
cities in the United States end was minister councilor to the 
embassy in Washington U.C.# and was minister in Washington B.G, in 1944. He was a representative to the oouAcil of organiz­ation of American states, Washington# 1948# deputy secretary general on the Inter-Amerlcaa conference of problems of war and peace# and representative to the ÜZîCIC, 1945 and to the 
General Assembly and Security Council# 1946,
^ l2S •
(now representing Mexico), Quo Tal-Chl» and Yolloso supported10the United States and British views* Grozny ko dropped his11proposal to oome to the support of the French resolution#i ’■
A vote was taken on the French resolution by a show of hands»
and It was rejected by 8 to 3* France, Poland, and the 
« 12 ,U#S*S#H. voted In favor of the resolution#
The second Soviet walkout now resulted from Groayko*a
contention that, since the U*5*S.a. and Iran had reached
an agreement and that Iron̂  >. had withdrawn Its appeal to
the Security Council, the defeat of the French resolution
violated the United Batlona Charter# The U.S.S.R# delegate
could take no part In future discussions of the Iranian queetloi 
13by the Council# The meeting was then adjourned#
The highlight of the thirty-sixth meeting was the second 
ôvlet walkout, but unlike his first walkout, Gromyko 
did not actually get up and leave the Council chamber* The 
meeting was so near adjournment that there was no need for 
this#
In spite of Iranis request to withdraw its appeal, 
Gromyko’s endless remonstrances, sarcasms, and outbursts,
10. -Security Council Official Recordŝ  First Year, First Series, 0̂*2#, pp# 210-213#
^Td., p* 213#
12# Ibli#, p# 213.
13. lÈlâ.# PP. 213-214#
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Bonnet's split with the other anti-Soviet powers over his 
resolution to delete the question fron the agendat the anti- 
Soviet forces retained their control of procedural matters 
la the Counoll, (̂ ny substantive matter, of coursê  was 
subject to Gromyko' s**vetô ) # And vlth the defeat of the 
French resolution, the Security Council remained the master 
of its own agenda*
II
,The next meeting of the Security Counoll to discuss 
the Iranian question (the fortieth} was held at Hunter 
College on Kay 8, 1946* Gromyko vas absent* The delay
resulted froa the Council's, taking no action until It had
%
received a letter from the Iranian representative on May 614
as provided for In the April 4 resolution* Ala's letter
categorically stated that Soviet troops already had been
evacuated fr<xs the provinces of Khurasan, Gorgan, Kazanderan, 
15and Gllan* But this picture of ̂ ovlet co-operation was 
shattered when the Iranian letter àtated that, in so far as 
the rest of Azerbaijan was ccwicomed, the Iranian government 
could make no investigation because of Soviet Interference* 
The Iranian government, it was true, had been informed by 
other sources that the evacuation of Soviet troops from
14* Ibid*, pp. 246-247*
15* Ibid.. p* 246*
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Azerbaijan vas underway, but these reports had not been 
verified by any Iranian official#
Stettinius* Busplolons of Soviet Intentions apparently 
had been justified, as had his leadership in keeping the 
question on the agenda# Because Gromyko hod ignored the 
Counoll*8 request to submit, a report by May ô and because 
the Iranian government still complained of Soviet interference 
Stettinius ehbmitted a prepared draft resolution# (Me had 
written it In advance after having read the Iranian letter}#
It read*
The Security Council.
HavinF. considered the statement made by the 
Iranian Government in its preliminary report of 
6 May# aubftitted in compliance with the resolution of 4 April 1946, that It was not able as of 6 Kay to state whether the withdrawal of all USSR troops from the whole of Iran had been completed,
ĴgsjayjSâ
To defer further proceedings on the Iranian matter in order that the Government of Iran may have time in which to ascertain through its official representatives whether all USSR troops have been withdrawn from the whole of Iran;
To request the Iranian Government to submit a complete report on the subject to the Security Council immediately upon the receipt of the.inform mat ion which will enable it so to do; andjln case it is unable to obtain ouch information by 20 Hay, to report on that day such information as 
is available to it at that time; and
To consider immediately following the receipt from the Iranian Government of the report requested 
what further proceedings may be required#̂ ^
16, lÈiâ,, pp, £47-248,
- 12S -
17Paul üasltiok (aov representing Australia) had no
objection to the Stettinius resolution **as far as It goes."
Complaining that It Ignored Gromykofailure to send In a
report (as required by the resolution of April 4), Kasluck
was deeply worried by the second absence of the Soviet 
18
delegate* Where did Gromyko stand* and did he claim "veto" 
rights?
Cadogan unmoved, by Gr(^yko*s absencê  undertook to
quiet Haeluck*a fears* As long as a quorum was maintained 
- 19In the Counoll* Its work was unimpaired* Since the resolution
before the Counoll was a procedural one, van Kleffens maintained
the Council had every legitimate right to vote on Stettinius*20
resolution in Gromyko s absence*
A vote was taken on the Stettinius resolution* and It21
was adopted without objection* The president then adjourned 
the meeting*
Althoughtthe fortieth meeting was the shortest held 
so far on the Iranian dispute* the Stettinius resolution
17. Paul nasluck (1905-* ) was director of the poqt-war
section of the department of external affdlrs, 1941-44* Ke was director of the post-hùstilltles division after &orld War II, and in 1946 he was representative to the Security 
Council and the Atomic Energy Council*
18* Security Council Official Records. First Year* First Series* Ho*2** pp* 240-250*
19# aid## p. 251*
20* Iklâ/i PP# 251-252** •
21. Ibia.. 9. 252.
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was passed and an Important legal problem was consideredi
what was the Counoll to do about the absence of the Soviet
member# Hasluck complained that the Council now had to
**obtain from the absent member a clear idea of what he22claims is the effect of his absence** and although it
seemed to him that *the first step towards resolving this 
: 23question" was an effort along this linê  the question was 
left undecided by the Council.
Three views Oame out of this absence of the Ü.S.S.R. 
representative. They are#
(1) In the practice of the Security Council 
absence of a member» even of a permanent member# does not prevent this body from adopting a reŝ  
olution. Absence of a permanent member is con­sidered to be equivalent to abstention from voting#
(2) While the question has thus arisen but one* it .would appear, on the basis of the Council*s action in the Iranian case, that an absence is 
regarded as having the same legal effect, so far as voting is concerned, as an abstention. It 
would thus appear that the absence of permanent member doe a not prevent the Security Council from taking a decision on substantive questions*
(5) In view of the case that on matters of sub-* stance the concurring votes of the permanent 
members is required, the Soviet Delegate by thus 
absenting himself caused à blanket veto over all substantive decisions which the Security Council have decided to take.24
22* Ibid.. p. 250 
23, Ibid., p. 250.
24* Leo* Gross, Voting in the Security Council; Abstention 
from Voting and Abstention from Meetings. The Xale Law 
Journal, February, 1951# ÿew Haven, Conn., .The Yale Law J ou m a l  Inc,,
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The antl-Sovlet siembers accepted the first two views, while 
Groayko adhering to a stricter Interpretation of the 
Charter, accepted only the third view*
III
The'forty-third and last meùtlng on the Iranian question
was held on May 22, 1946* Again the Soviet representative
25̂was ateenti;* A« Farodl (France) was the new piresldent*
In the previous two day#, the Iranian delegate had sub­
mitted two conflicting reports to the Counoll. On May 20,
Ala had written that he had received no very precise Infor# 
matlon about the situation in his country and that the con­
ditions laid down by the Security Council had not been ful- 26
filled. On toy 21, however, he wrote that Soviet troops
27had evacuated Azerbaijan by Kay 6, And Ghavaa, the Iranian
prime minister, had telegraphed to the president of the Council
that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from Azerbaijan by 28May 6, In view of the confused situation the presiDf/Ĵ regrette<
25. Alexandre Parodl (1901- } became director-generalof the French committee of national liberation and of the financial and social council of resistance in 1944# Hewas minister of labor, 1944-46 end president of the Intematlom labor conference, 1945, ambassador to Rome and delegate to the allied advisory council for Italy, 1945. He became a {permanent member to the United Nations, 1946,
26* Security Council Official Records. First Tear, First 
Scries, ÿo^yi^ment No#2,, pp, 52-53.
27, IbM,f PP# 53-54.
26, Security Council Offlclal Records. First Tear, First 
Series, No,2., p. 287,
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The antl~Sovlet aembere accepted the first two views, while 
Gromyko adhering to a stricter interpretation of the 
Charter, accepted only the third view*
III
The forty-third and last meeting on the Iranian question
was held on May 22, 1946* Again the Soviet representative
25̂was abfionti.. A* Parodl (France) was the now pxresldent*
In the previous two dayp, the Iranian delegate had sub­
mitted two conflicting reports to the Council* On hay 20,
Ala had written that he had received no very precise Infoxv 
matlon about the situation In his country and that the con­
ditions laid down by the Security Council had not been ful- 26
filled* On îîay 21, however, he wrote that Soviet troops
27had evacuated Azerbaijan by Kay 6* And Ghavam, the Iranian
prime minister, had telegraphed to the president of the Council
that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from Azerbaijan by 28
May 6* In view of the confused situation the presto^ regrette<
25. Alexandre Parodl (1901- ) became director-generalof the French committee of national liberation and of the 
financial and social council of resistance In 1944* He was minister of labor, 1944-46 and president of the Internationa 
labor conference, 1945* ambassador to Rome and delegate to the allied advisory council for Italy, 1945* He became a î̂ ermanent member to the United Hatlons, 1946*
26* Security Council Official Records, First Tear, First 
Series, Sop figment Ho*2*, pp, 52-53.
27* Ibii^f PP* 53-54.
28* Security Council Official Records* First Year, First 
Series, Ho*2#, p* 287*
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fretted the Iranian complilnt In Alâ fi letter of I-Iay 20,
' 29After welooiaing Luis Padilla Nervo, the new Mexican 
representative, Stettinius suggested that no aoti(w be 
taken on the Iranian question until theaituation of conflicting 
reports bad been cleared up* But the question was not to 
be dropped from the agenda, Cadogan agreed with Stettinius 
butL he described Ohavaa’a telegram as only an interim 
report*̂  He wanted an answer to "certain questions to
31elucidate further the attitude of the Government in Tehran,#’* 
First, did the territory referred to in the Iranian telegram 
include all the places formerly occupied by Soviet troops. 
Second, was the government in Tehran satisifed with the evaOr* 
nation of the Soviet troops* Third,t what steps had the Iranian 
Investigating commission teiken to verify the report that 
equipment and means of transport had been removed,. Fourth, 
had any investigatim been made of the reports to the Iranian 
government by the loyal Iranians in those provinces just 
evacuated. As it turned out, no one answered these questions 
directly, but Ala answered similar questions later put to 
him by Lange,
Lange expressed regret over the way in which the Council
29# Luis fad ilia Nervo (1898-̂  ) entered the diplomaticservice in 1930 and was a representative to the League of 
Nations in 1937# In 1946, he was chairman of the delegation to the last assembly of the League In Geneva and a represent­
ative to the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the 
Atomic Energy Commission#
30# Security Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Series, Ko, 2,, pp. 287̂ 208# '
31# Ibid.# p, 289.
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32had handled the Iranian mattdr# It was unfortunate that
Bonnet*3 proposal had been defeated, and It %raa contrary
to the "letter and spiirlt" of the Charter to retain the questio
on the amenda# Lange had looked up the places mentl<«ed
tn the Iranian report, he said, and the places mentioned
covered the whole of Aze^gmijan# The only course open to
the Council was the imnedate deletion of the Iranian question
froa the agenda#
To straighten out the confusion caused by the conflicting
Iranian reports, van Kleffens proposed to seat Ala at the 
33Council table# The proposal vas adopted without discussions,
and at the Invitation of the president, Ala was seated#
Van Kleffens asked Ala if the complaint relative to Soviet
interference were before the Council again.
To Ala*8 knowledge, Iren*» first complaint was still 
' 34on the agenda# He explained that the Iranian withdrawal of 
its dispute from the agenda concerned the second part only, 
i.e., the evacuation of ̂ oviet troops. The withdrawal had 
not included Iran*© complaint about Soviet interference in 
Iran*» domestic affairs# However, Soviet assurances had 
prompted Ghavam to withdraw the entire dispute on April 15#
32; Ibid.# p, 290.
33. -Ibid., pjl 291-292#
34# Ibid.. p# 293#
-
As for Ghavan*a tslerram, Ala thought It was Inconclusive
In thet It did not clearly state that Soviet troops had
been withdrawn from all of Azerbaijan* To clear up the con-»
fusion resulting from his oonfllotlng reports, he reminded
the Council that the I-Igy 20 report had been due on that day
at the latest* However, on Hay 21, he had received this
new information and had Inmedâtely sent It to the Council*,
Lan̂ e now resumed his Ibns-lnterrupted t̂ teVtèt^ with
35Ala* Lance wanted four questions answered. First, had the 
Iranian Government lost faith In the assurances of the U.S«S#R. 
!îcxt he wanted to know If the Government of Iran agreed with 
Byrnes* statement In which he said, "After all, the withdrawal 
of troops without condition la the only sane method of dis­
posing of any question of Interference In the government of .36
Iran." Third, did the Iranian government have other complaints 
la addition to the wlthdmwal of troops. Fourth, did Iran 
Consider the U.S.S.R. as the only country Interfering In 
the Internal affairs of Iran.
Answering the Polish delegate question for question,37Ala vent into a lengthy discussion of the first question.
35. Àtia.. pp. 294-295.
36. -Itia.. p. 294.
37. Itia.. p. 295.
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The Iranian covem.Ticnt had not lost confidence In the 
U.S.3.R., "we ere continuing to hope," said Ala# Every 
sane Iranian wanted friendly relations with Iron’s great 
northern neighbor# Again accusing Soviet authorities of 
encouraging the autonomy movement In Azerbaijan, Aia still 
was not sure that the Iranian case should be dropped from 
the agenda# As for the Eymea statement, Ala reminded 
Lange that the Council had aocepted It earlier• It had been* 
and still was hoped that the withdrawal of •Soviet troops 
would terminate Soviet Interference la the Internal affairs 
of Iran
As for implication that other nations were Interfering
In Iran, Ala clearly and defiantly contended that the
alone was intervening# Hot only had the United States and
the Pnlted Kingdom withdrawn their troops, but, as far as
Ala knew* those two countries had never Interfered In Iranian
internal affairs* (fie obviously me#r since World War II*
since the British for centuries, had Interfered la one fora or
another* In Iran and Ala made no mention of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company)# As for Lange’s map reading, Ala said
the names mentioned In Ghavam’s telegram sounded as though
they were In the western part of Azerbaijan, and Soviet troops
might very well still be stationed In some of the smaller 
38
vUlagoa*
38# Ibid.. p. 297.
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Lange thanked Ala for his answers but asked him to 
bear with him for a few alnutes longer, "so that I may 
request elucidation on three more points which are connected 
with his answers** First, If the central govemment had 
been unable to send a, commission to Azerbaijan and, at 
the same time, bad Informed the Counoll that various places 
in Azerbaijan had been carefully Investigated, Lange 
wanted to know whether these * Investigations" had been con­
ducted *from an aeroplane by telescope?" Second, who was 
rightt the prime minister who declared that Soviet troops 
had been evacuated by Zlay 6 or Ala who asserted that he was 
not quite sure that they had been evacuated. Third*
Does the withdrawal of the complaint made In the letter from the representative of Iran On 
15 April hold or shàll we Interpret his action now as presenting us with a new conplalnt?̂ ^
While he did not want to Interrupt the exchange of
Views going on between the Polish and Iranian delegates,
Stettinius nevertheless wanted to make It clear that It
would be a mistake to drop the Iranian case this particular
morning. He suggested that the Iranian dispute be deferred r 41
until a later meeting to be celled by the president,
39* Ibid,, pp* 297-298,
AO, Ibid.. p. 298.
Ax, p, 298,
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Eaaluclcl Astral la) also called Lange's attention to the 
fact thai.̂ the Iranian quest Im vas at HI on the agenda ̂ and̂  
while.%»,1^ Is Interesting to know whether or not the Iranian
41 .1 '
Ooremroent withdraws any statement In regard to this matter ̂ I 4a 'before the Council#.*" the Council alone would decide
t
whether the .complaint would remain on the agenda. Sĉ a-
vhat offended, Lange replied that he wanted It understood
"emphatically that the Qovemment of Poland accepts all
43declslona arrived at by this Council#"*
Ala got his chandO to answer the last three questions
after Lange had answered Hasluok's charges. As for the
"aeroplane>and telescope" the investigating commission had 
: »travelled In an airplane, a Soviet one. but as for using a
44"telescope or even a microscope," Ala knew nothing. The 
Council alone had Jurisdiction over whether the question would 
be dropped frcsa the agenda, and̂ It was true that the Iranian 
government had asked for the removal of the second part of the 
complaint, namely troop evacuation* It had done so under 
the Impression that the Soviet government would honor Its 
assurances. (Ala forgot that the Iranian statement of 
April 15 "ending" the dispute had not separated the complaint
42.* Ibid.. p. 299# 
43# m i d .; p. 299#
44; Ibid;; p. 299#
f  -
Into two parts)# liorecrrer, tor Lan^e to understand the
telê raa ooapletely, he had to read all of It. Sot knowing
at the moment Just where his government stood, Ala assumed
45that the question should be kept on the agenda.
After fad 111 o Servo suggested that the discussion be
postponed to give the Council more tine to examine the
oase, fsrodl (France) urged a coiipronlse solution* Pojrodl
asked the Councils
•••to leave the question on the agenda for a 
short time on the understanding that If within a certain period (say eight or ten days) no 
Informatlm has been received which wexild conflict 
with that already in our possession, the question will automatically be dropped from the agenda,47
Although the Fx*enoh position was not too far removed
from that of the antl-Sovlet bloc, Cadogan was "very sorry**
that he could not accept It#. Before the question was dropped
from the agenda, he wanted the Iranian government to be40
completely satislfled# Stettinius as usual agreed with
49Cedogsn’s remarks.
When the president asked Padlllo Kervo If he had pro-* 
posed any specific period of postponement, the latter replied
45# Ib.̂ d., p# 500,
46, Ibid.. ppp. 500-301#
47* ibM., p. 502,
48, X̂ i4#, p, 505#
49, Ibid.# p. 305#
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50that one or two daye would euffloe# Both HaaXuclc and
Lans® dleasreed with such a postponemeatp and Lanse In turn
aug£08ted that the Council send a telecraa to the Iranian
prime minister, aXJclns If he were fully satislfled with the
51withdrawal of soviet troops#
Taking exception to the proposed telegram, van Kleffens
made his own motion;
llay I move that adjourn the discussion of the Iranian question until a date in the near future, the Council to be called to­gether at the request of any menber#52
Badillo Hervo then withdrew his proposal to support von
Kleffens# The" president called for a vote on the Aether-
53Xàndfl propoaal,"and it ̂ as adopted by 9 votes to 1 vote# 
Lange cast the negative vote# A vote on the Bolieh pro­
posal to ceni a telegram to the Iranian prime minister was
54rejected by 8 votes to 2# The meeting was then adjourned#
r/
The forty-third meeting proved to to the last meeting 
in which the Security Council discussed the Iranian question# 
Although the Netherlands resolution provided for a meeting 
on the question at some later date it was never called*
50, J È M
51, i m
52, iUfi
53,
54. m i
» P, 203*
• p, 304, 
, P. 304, 
, P, 305.
• P. 305.
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Again the CDuacH postponed action‘end left the dis­
putants to work out a compromise solution by themselves#
Van Zleffens'r resolution followed the same line as 
the other fcarlier antl-Sovlet proposals and resolutions.
I.e.. postpone action on thé Iranian question while the 
U»S.S.R# and Iran negotiated* The French proposal auto­
matically to drop the question after a specified period, 
however. Hid not suit the leaders of the antl-Sovlet bloc, 
namely the United States and the United Kingdom#
Lange tried his &est to carry out Gromykô  a policy, 
and he was consistently pro-^ovlet In hi© arguments# Gromyko*ô
r
absence In Itself led to some legal soul-searching by Hasluck, 
especially since Gromyko had Ignored the Council resolution 
of April 4 to make a report to the Council# But the Issue 
of •‘absence and veto" vas never specifically settled* That 
the Council continued to discuss the Iranian question, 
however. Implied that It was procedural la nature and that 
the Soviet absence did not constitute a "veto."
Borne confusion vas caused by Ala’s conflicting reports# 
However, he removed the confusion by pointing out that he 
had obeyed the Como 11 resolution of April 4 to communicate 
with the Council as soon as seme thing new had appeared# Ala, 
Indeed, reflected the eagerness of the Iranian government 
to remain on good terns with both the U*3#G.R# and the Council# 
When Gromyko sneered at the personal integrity of the Iranian
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delegate, Ala replied with no personal remarks about 
Soviet integrity, except to aay that he believed In it.
At the Same time, he followed the Council*» requirmnents 
to the letter*
After Gromyko*s walkout (he was present when other 
matters were .eonsldered) the discussions were much more 
amiable. And the anti-Soviet:.bloo again demonstrated its 
power over Council procedure when it adopted the van Kleffens 
resolution and rejected Lange’s proposal,
The Council, by postponeing the question **untll a date 
in the near future,** postponed it for good, and the question 
was to remain on the agenda indefinitely* As late as the 
Bummer of 1951» oo move had been made to remove it from 
the agenda.
— Î4l —
CHAPTEa 7.
'CONCLUSION
I
through the centuales* Iran ham had to play the part 
of a small power whose sovereignty and independence wdre 
limited by interested great powers, especially Russia 
(or the Soviet Union) and Great Britain* For various 
reasons (see Chapter 1), these powers had played power 
politics In Iran without any regard for Iran’s welfare or 
benefit., In deferise, Iran developed the policy of trying 
to play one great power off against the other and in this 
way maintained:its independence*
This policy oame to naught when in 1907 Russia and Great 
Britain reached an agreement to divide Iran (then Persia) 
into three splieres of' influence* However, the defeat of
s'
Imperial Russia in World War I and the rise of the Bolshevik! 
to power upset the balance ,of power in the Near East, and 
Great Britain tried to make Iran a dependency In fact if not 
in name. But in 1921, Soviet Russia and Iran concluded a 
friendship agreement permitting the Soviet Union to inter­
vene In Iran in the event of Intervention by a third party*
In 1925» the old dynasty was overthrown by Rlza Shah, 
an army officer who oame to be called the Mustafa Nemal of 
Iran* Hie attempts to modernize the country and make it 
independent and progressive nation did not succeed, but
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they did.Involve Iran In a dispute with the Anglo-lranian
/Oil Obmpanĵ  the Biriliah ooncession acquired in 1914. 
this dispute, and one earlier with the Soviets in 1919-20, 
brought]Iran as a suppliant to the Oouno il of the League
of Bâtions. It is instructive to note briefly the similar-*
Ity of̂  |tb.e Iranian oase in the United Bâtions with the Iran-
U'ian oases in the League of Hâtions.
Thji first case that came before the League in 1920 
w#a an jlz^ian complaint against Soviet Russia. White 
Russieoi forces under General Denikin were using Persia as
a base ofioperations against Soviet Russia, which retaliated
' &by bombing the Persian port of Enzeli on the Caspian Sea
) ^ Twhere Wjhi|e Russian troops were stationed. .Upcm the receipt 
of several letters from the Persian foreign minister, the 
Leagu^ Council, on June 16, 1920, took up the matter. But,
/ ilil^ the Security Council on January 30, 1946, it adopted
a y^eolution to the effect that, b̂efore taking acting,
ii would be well to await the results of direct negotiations1between parties." The negotiations resulted in the 1921 
treaty.
A second dispute Involving Persia was brought before 
the League of Hâtions by the British government on December 
14, 1932. At this time, the Persian government had cancelled
1. United Nations News. Vol. I., No. 5*, May 1946, New 
York, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, p. 3*
”  1*3 T
the concession held hy the Anglo-Perslan Oil Company,
The British government took up the:Oil company’s case and 
protested the cancellation of the concession* In this case, 
too, the League Council deferred consideration of the questlcm 
until negotiations were finally concluded by a new agreement,
an agreemaat ^̂ considerably more favorable to Persia than2
the original concession,*
In the Security Council aalln the League Council, the 
Iranian question was postponed again and again, and the 
disputes were left to settlement by direct negotiations*
Even as It must be remembered that Iran’s negotiating 
position was greatly strengthened by having Its disputes
on the agendas of the Councils, These International or
/world organizations. In spite of their obnloua weaknesses, 
have proved their worth, at least to Iran*
When the Iranian government became Involved.In World 
War II, there followed the abdication of Elza Shah and the 
occupation of the country by British, Soviet and later 
Americam troops. After using Iran to protect an Important 
supply route to the C*S.S*H., the British and American troops 
left the country at the end of the war* But the Soviet Union 
not only fostered an &uton<my movement In Azerbaijan but 
all during the war and afterwards. Interfered In the Internal 
affairs of Iran* Confronted with what seemed to be an almost
2* %b^d*, p* A*
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impossible situation after the failure of negotiating 
with the and the Moscow conference, and remembering
its successes with League backing, the Iranian government 
referred the dispute to the new United Hat Ions Security 
Council*
II
In taking up the Iranian question in its second meeting, 
the Security Council was courageous in meeting head on a 
dispute that threatened to disturb world peace* In the 
actual working of the Security Council, every member felt 
that far more was at stake than the solution of one problem* 
Since the Iranian complaint was the first important oase 
to come before it, the Security Council probed for techinques 
and prinioplea that might be cited as precedents in future 
eases* Each member was clearly conscious that each separate 
step in the proceedings was of long-run significance.
The members of the Council tried to support their 
arguments by citing as evidence the relevant articles of 
the Charter and especially those articles in Chapter 6* To 
sustain their arguments, all members tried to Interpret a 
procedure that soon involved the Security Council la a problem 
that has not yet been solved. I.e.,whether the Council should 
adhere to a "broad" or a "strict* interpretation of the Charter, 
The Soviet representatives, in particular, insisted on a 
strict or literal interpretation* On the other hand, the
-XA5T
or th0 Council led bj the United States and 
Great Britain* wanted the procedure of the Council kept 
flexible and fluid under a broad interpretatlcn of the 
Charter*
The Council also encountered the difficulty for the 
first time* of the absence of a permanent member* Since 
It had to be decided whether the action taken by the Council 
were procedural or substantive* the Soviet walkout raised 
the question of whether the Council could take action on 
the Iranian oase* Ikider Article 27* paragraph 2* the Council 
could take action on any procédural Question with the affir­
mative vote of 7 of Its members. However, under paragraph 
3 of the same article, the Council had to have the poncurrlnR 
votes of the five permanent members on any question other 
than procedural* f. >e.. a ̂jgubatantlve question* This Is the 
"veto."
It was seamlngty decided In the Iranian case that the 
action taken In the absence of the Soviet representative 
was of rrocedurai nature and therefore not subject to a
SovlCf'hianket veto*** It la pertinent to observe that ae 
little mention as possible was made ofthe absence of the 
Soviet representative despite the fears of many observers 
that the new organization would break up over this question* 
The Council did not reprimand the Soviet representative In 
any way* offlclaly or biherwlse* It was content to deal
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with the queetlcm at hand# namely Ita eompetenoe to adopt 
procedural resolutions during the absence of the Soviet 
delegate.
Even though the Council never acted on, or even considered 
the substance of the Iranian questlm# Iran benefited greatly 
from being able to play off the antl-Sovlet bloc against 
the Soviet bloc and to publicize Its complaint In a world 
forum. . Iran# in fact, used the United Nations against 
the Soviet Union to protect Its threatened independence 
and sovereignty# and the agreement reached with the U.S.S.R* 
(outside the Council) waa shaped by the Council’s threat 
to reconsider the question should that agreement be unsatis­
factory to Iran'* Without the Security Council’s help 
an agreement would have been reached between the two dis- 
pu tante that would have been entirely favorable to the U.3.8.R* 
Perhaps Iren would have lost ita Sovereignty altogether* But 
Iran was able not only to re-establish Its sovereignty over 
Azerbaijan In December, 1946 but also to readh a favorable 
settlement over oil concessions with the Soviet Union only 
because It had a place to take Its grievances where It could 
hop à for a fair hearing* While the Council seemed at times 
to be a debating society only# It performed In reality the 
duty of a International tribunal where a small power could 
present Its case against a great power#
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After the Netherlands proposal to **adJoum the dis­
cussion of the Iranian question until a date In the near 
future, the Council to be called together at the request 
of any member, only one more reference was made to the 
question 1th 1946. This was a letter from the Iranian
ambassador to the United States to the secretary-general of4
the United Nations* The letter was a report concerning 
the state of affairs In the province of Azerbaijan* It in 
part stated that the central government had not yet bean 
able to re-establish its authority In Azerbaijan and that 
the Soviet ambassador had advised the central government 
not to try to send troops to this province. To preserve 
order 1$ the general election of December 7» however, Iran 
would take the action necessary to maintain law and order 
throughout Iran* The Iranian government was glad of the 
decision of the Security Council to remain •‘seized'* of the 
question.
By the end on December, 1946, the Iranian government 
was able to suppress the autonomy movement In Azerbaijan 
and the general election (supposed to take place In Dec­
ember) was held In January, The Iranian dispute was ended.
3* Security Council Official Records. First Year, First 
Series, No, 2., p, 304.
4. United Nations Yearbook. 1946-1947. Department of Pub­
lic Information, Lake Success, New York, pp. 335-336.
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In It. Grant wrote on the history of Persia frcsa 
the 6th century B.C, to the present, and In doins so, covered her subject briefly but accurately* Kindle 
predicted social revolution and also wrote a brief 
sumary of the situation In Iren frcm 19C7» The Infomctlon presented a different viewpoint,since it was made up of republished Soviet newspaper 
articles from fravda* I%vestl&. Red l̂t.a.r and mterlal from other Soviet periodicals* a very &ood bvssssbxj of the Iranian dispute was £ivcn in .■Xntematl.on..al Organization6m The summary covered the pro£resa of 
the Iranian question in Its entirety, through the 
Security Cmmcil, An article by Supreme Court Justice pouglsB, and several other articles concerning Iran 
were found in LifCm Along with the pictures of the country and the people, the articles were Interesting 
and Informative* l̂eweweelc covered In detail Groayko a walkout and gave a picture of Byrnes* twisting around 
in hi a seat to watch Gromyko leave* .Time carried & 
story about the Soviet walkout also but lacked the picture# The background for Iron in the League of Nations was derived froa the tbited n̂tlona News.
A good sujGEsary of the effect of tîio absence of the Soviet dôlegateffrœa the Security Council was given In 2m lals. 6&K
C, SEViS?SK35S
The ??ew. rorft Tines. Swrembsr, IS44.
The New Yoyk Times was a good source for back» ground Ê itertsl cm the Iranien question#
apictdix
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TEXT OF yHS ANGLO-ROSSIAH 
BAPPROCHEHEOT REGARDim PERSIA
Î2SZ
The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and Independence 
of Persia* and sincerely desiring the preservation of order 
throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for 
the trade and industry of allother nations;
Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order In certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frcmtler on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan end Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the abovementioned 
provinces of Persia)
Have agreed on the following terms*—
I# Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and 
not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, and Concessions of a political or commerlcal nature— such as Concessions for railways, bahks, 
telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, et s.— beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Bhlrin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, 
Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Susalan and Afghan frontires, and not to 
oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions 
In this region which are supported by the Russian Government#It is understood that the above-mentioned places are Included 
In the region In which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.
II. Russia, or her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a 
political or commercial nature— such as Concessions for rail­ways, banka* telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—  
beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gaaik, 
Birjand, Kerman, andeending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Con­
cessions in this region which are supported by the British 
Goverament. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are Included in the region, inwwhich Russia engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.
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III. Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without 
previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any Concession whatever to British subjects in the regions of 
Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I 
and II.Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of Concession to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia*
All Concession existing at present in the regions indioate< in Articles I and II are maintained.
17. It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of Pars is tan and of the 
Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amoritization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the "Banque d* Escompte et des Prêta de Perse* up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.
It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those 
of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the Posts and Isle graphs/ shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Gov­
ernment of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement.
7. In the event of irregularities occurring in the amort­ization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the "Banque d̂  Escompte et des Prêts de Perse* 
and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the . 
signature of the present Agteement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the 
loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in 
the region mentlonediin Article II of the present Agreement, of for Great Britain to establish ccntrol over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans con­
cluded With the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the present Agreement, the British 
and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of cwbrol in question 
and to avoid all Interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Agreement,
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TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND THE RUSSIAN 
REPUBLIC. MOSCOW. FEBRUARY 26. 1921 
(Ratlflcatlona exchanged at Teheran̂  February 26, 1922)
{Translation,)
The Persian Government, or the one part, and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, of the other part, desiring 
to establish relations of friendship and fraternity between the two nations;; have decided to engage In negotiations for 
this purpose, sjnd have therefore appointed the following Plenipotentiaries*
For Persia:? Ala Gholi Ehan Mochaverol-Mamalek, and
For RusslaV O.V, Chloherla and L,M.Ksrakhan,Who, after the verification of their respective powers, have ag^ed as follows ;
Art* I*/In/hrder to confirm Its declarations regarding Russian policy /towards the Persian nation, which formed the 
subject of correspondence on the lAth January', 1918, and the 26th June, 1019,[the R.S.F.3.R*. formally affirms once again 
that It definitely renounces the tyrannical policy carried out by the blionising Governments of Russian which have 
been overthrown .by the will of the woï?pr/tf and peasants of Russia. /Ii;rspired bÿ this principle, and desiring that the Persian people should be happy and Independent and should be able/to dis ŷse freely of Its patrimony, the Russian Republic declass the whole body of treaties and conventions 
concluded wit̂ : Persia by the Tsarist Government, which crushed the rights/of the Persian people, to be null and void.
If. R*SâF,S#R*. expresses Its reprobation of the 
policy'of; thf''Tsàr 1st Governments of Russia, which, , on the 
pretext o f surIng the Independence of the peoples of Asia, 
concluded. Without the consent of the latter, treaties with 
Europeair Ppwer̂ , the sole object of which was to subjugate those peofiies» ,
Thie criminal policy, which Infringed upon the Indepen­
dence the; countries of Asia and which made the living 
natiohâ 'of "the East a prey to the cupidity and the tyranny 
of ̂ ro^an {robbers. In abandoned unconditionally by Federal Russia. I'
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Federal Russiâ  therefore, Irj accordance with the princ­
iples laid down in Articles I and IV of this Treaty, declares 
its refusal to participate in any action which misht destroy its refusal to participate in a«y action which might destroy 
or weaken Persian sovereignty. It regards as null and void the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded by 
the former Russian Government with third parties in respect of Persia or to the detriment of that country
III, The two Gontradting Powers agree to accept and respect the Husao-Persian frontleas, as drawn by the Frontier Commission in 1881,
At the same time, inview of the repugnance which the Russian Federal Government feels to enjoying the fruit of the policy of usurpation of the Tsarist Government, it re­
nounces all claim to the Achouradeh Islands and to the other 
islands on the Astrabad Littoral* and restores to Persia the village of FiroUzeh and the adjacent land ceded to Russia 
in virtue of the convention of the 28th May, 1893.
The Persian Government agrees for its part that the Russian Sarakhfi* or '*old** Sarakhs, and the land adjacent to the Sarakhs River* shall be retained by Russia,The two High Contracting Parties shall have equal rights 
Of UGuage of thé Atrak River and the other frontier rivers 
and waterways, In order finally to solve the question of the waterways and all disputes concerning frontiers or territories* a Commission* composed of Russian and Persian represent­atives shall be appointed.
IV, In consideration of the fact that each nation has the rlfeht to determine freely its political destiny* each . of the two Contracting Parties formally expressed its desire to abstalh from any intervention in the internal affairs of the other,
T. The tyo High Contracting Parties undertake—
1. To prhhlbit the formation or presence within their 
respective territories of any organizations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known* 
whose object Is to engage in acts of hostility aagainst 
Persia or Russia* or against the allies of Russia,T They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or 
armies within their respective territories with the afore­
mentioned object.
Not to allow a third party or any organization* what­
ever It %é )Called* which is hostile to the other Contracting 
Party* tCK jlmport or to convey in transit across their countries 
fiaaterial̂ 'wMch can be used against the other Party,
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3. To prevent by all means In their power the presence 
wlthirttholr territories or within the territories of their allies of all armies or forces of a third party in cases 
in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of the other 
Contracting Party*
YI* If a third party should attempt to tarry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or 
if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign Power 
should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian Interior for the pur­
poses of carrying out the military ope%*ations necessary 
for its defence* Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon a,s the danger has been 
removed.
VII. The considerations set forth in Article VI have 
euual weight in the matter of the securitjr of the Caspian Sea. The two High Contracting Parties therefore have agreed 
tSat Federal Russia shall have the right to require the Persian Government to send away foreign subjects, in the event of their taking advantage of their engagement in the Persian 
navy to undertake hostile action against Russia*
VIII. Federal Russia finally renounces the economic policy pursued In the East by the Tsarist Government, which 
consisted in lending money to the Persian Government, not with a view to the economic development of the country, but rather for purposes of political subjugation.Federal Russia accordingly renounces Its rights In 
respect of the loands granted to Persia by the Tsafiat Gov­ernment b. Jt regards the debts due to it as void, and -will not require their repayment, Russia likewise renounces its claims to the resources of Persia which were specified as security for the loans in question,
IX* In view of the declaration by whch it has repudiated 
the colonial and capitalist policy which occasioned so many misfortunes and was the cause of so much bloodshed. Federal Russia abandons the continuât!cm of the economic undertakings 
of the Tsarist Government, the object of which was the economic 
subjugation of Persia, Federal Russia therefore codes to the 
PeralEin Government the full ownership of all funds and of all 
real and, other property which the Russian Dlsco’jnt Bank 
possesses on Persian territory, and likewise transfers to it 
all the assets and liabilities of that bank. The Persian 
Government nevertheless agrees that In the towns where it has
— 15^ *•
been decldeà the RubaIan Socialist Republic may establish consulateŝ  I and ,Where buildings exist belonging to the Dis­count Bank»! one'Of these buildings, to be chosen by the Russian Government/' shall be placed at the dlspohal of the 
Russian/Consulate, free of chajnge*
/' /Xj'̂ The Russian Federal Government, having abandoned the 
colonial! policy,) which consisted In the construction of roads and tel%raph line more in order to obtain military Influence 
In other*! couàtrlés that for the purpose of developing their civilizations, belhg desirous of providing the Persian people with thode means,of communication Indispensable for the 
lndepep(ddnce jdevelop̂ tenl of any nation, and also In order to compei^ate the Persian people as far as possible for the 
lossesilnjcurred by the,sojourn In its territory of:the Tsarist armies/, #ede* free of charge to the Persian Government the 
foilowlĥ k’Russian Installations*
, ' '
,/(a){A\e 'high-roads from Ehzeli to Tehran, and from 
EatVln to Hamid an, end all land and Installations In con­nect Ion. V 1th these roads,^b/ The/railroad Djoulfa-Taurla-Soflan-Urmla, with all Installctlond* rolling-stOGk, and accessories,/(cl) The lahding-stages, warehouses, steamships, canals, 
and 4ll/.î eah0 of transport of the lake of Urmia.All telegraph and telephone lines established In Persia by the Tsarist Governments, with all movable and Immov­
able/ l̂ stlal̂ ations and dependencies,/ (é) Thie port of Enzell and the warehouses, with the elect 
trl6ai installation, and other buildings,
XÎ* In ; view of the fact that the Treaty of Turkomantch&l 
oonolyded the 10th February, 1828 (old style), between Peralh and Rasa la, which forbids Persia, under the terms of Art idle tt> have vessels in the waters of the Caspian Sea, 
IS'abrogated/, In accordance with the principles set forth In 
Article I olf the present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties ah^l enjoy equal rights of free navigation on that 
sea, unde^ their own flagŝ  as from the date of the signing 
of the present Treaty,I '> I 1
X̂IlL The Russian Federal Govemr̂ ent, having officially renounoedj all economic Interests obtained by military pre­
ponderance, further declares that,?».apart from the concessions 
whl^h fojp the subject of Articles IX and X, the other con­cessions ’ obtained by force by the Tsarist Government and its 
subjects sh&ll also be regarded as null and void,
i Î ' I-
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In conformity therewith the Russian Federal Government 
restoreŝ  as from the date of the sighing of the present Treaty# to the Persian Government as representing the Persian 
people, all thê  concessions in question, whether already 
being worked or not, together with all land taken over In vlrtjue Of those concessions.
Of the lands and properties situated In Persian and 
bclCKjgins to the former Tsarist Government, only the pre­mises of the Russian Legation at Tehran and at Zerguendeh with all movable and immovable appurtenances, as well as all real and other property of the Couneulates and Vlce-Counoulates 
shall be retained by Russia* Russia abandons, however, her right to administer the village of Zorgundeh, which was arrogated to itself by the former Tsarist Government.
XIII., The Persian Government, for its part, promised not 
to cede toUa third Power, or to its subjects, the e once salons 
and property restored to Persia by virtue of the present Treatŷ  and to maintain those rights for the Persian nation.
XIV. The Persian Government, recognising the importance Of the Caspian fisheries for the food supply of Russia, 
promises to conCi-Ude with the Food Service of the Russian 
Socialist Federal Soviet Republic immediately un on the expiry of the legal period of these existing engagements* a con­tract relating to the fisheries, containing appropriate claused* Furthermore, the Persian Government promises to examine, in agreement with the Government of the Russian Sovlallst Federal Soviet Republic, the means of at once 
conveyIhg the produce of the fisheries to the Food Serviceof Soviet Russia pending the conclusion of the above contract*
X7* In accordance with the principle of liberty of con­science re-claimed by Soviet Russia, and with a desire to put an end, in Moslem countries, to religious propaganda, the real object of which was to exercise political influence over the masses and thus to satisfy the rapacity of the Tsarist 
Government, the Government of Soviet Russia declared that 
the religious settlements established in Persia by the former 
Tsarist Govera^ent^ are abolished* Soviet Russia will take steps to prevent such missions from being sent to Persia in 
the future*Soviet Russia cedes unconditionally to the nation rep­
resented by'the Persoan Government the lands, property and 
buildings belonging to the Orthodix Mission situated at Urmia, 
together with the other similar establishments. The Persian 
Government shall.use these properties for the construction of 
schools and other institutions intended for educational purposes.
X60 —
X7I* By virtue of the communication from Soviet Russia 
dated the 25th June, 19X9» with reference to the abolition 
of consular jurisdictions, it la decided that Russian sub­
jects in Persia and Persian subjects In Russia shall, as from 
the date of the present Treaty, be placed upon the same footing as the Inhabitants of the towns In which they reside; they shall be subject to the laws of their country of residence, and shall submit their complaints to the local Courts,
XTII, Persian subjects in Russia and î̂ ealan subjects In Persia shall be exempt from military service and from all military taxation,
XVIII, Persian subjects In Russian and Russian subjects In Persia shall, as regards travel within the respective countjties- enjoy the rights granted to the most favoured nations other than countries aHled to them,
XIX, Within a short period after the signature of the 
present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties shall resume commercial relations. The methods to be adopted for the organisation of the import and export of goods, methods of 
payment, and the customs duties to be levied by the Persian Government on goods originating In Russia, shall be determined, under a coramerdlal Convention, by a special Commission con­sisting of representatives of the two High. Contracting Parties,
XX, Each of the two High ContractIhg Parties grants
to the other the right of transit for the transport of goods passing through Persia or Russia and consigned to a third 
country.The dues exacted in such cases shall not be higher than those levied on the goods of the most favoured nations other 
than countries allied to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet 
Republic,The conditions of these relations 6hall be fixed by 
a postal and telegraphic Convention,
XXII, In order to consolidate the good relations be­tween the two neiewflouring Powers and to facilitate the real­
isation of the friendly intentions of each country towards 
the other, each of the High Contracting Parties shall, immed­iately after the signature of the present Treaty, be represented 
la the capital of the other by a Plenipotentiary Represent­ative, who shall enjoy the rights of extra-territoriality 
and other privileges to which diplomatic representatives 
are entitled by International law and usuage end by the regulations and customs of the two countries.
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XXIII. In order to develop their mutual relations, the two Hieh Contractins Parties shall establish Consulates in places to be determined by coBBUon agreement..
The rights and duties of the Ô ŝula aliall be fixed 
bj a special Agreement to be concluded without delay after the signature of the present Treaty. This Agreement shall conform to' the provisions inforce in the two countries with 
regard to consular establishments.
XXIV. This Treaty shall be ratified within a period of three-months. The exchange of ratlficaticHis shall take 
place at Thhran as soon as possible.
'i'"XXV, The present Treaty is drawn up in Russian and Persian̂  Both texts shall be regarded as originals and both shall be authentic,I*
xXvi. The present Treaty shall come into force imedlately 
upon signature.In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present 
Treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.Bone at Moscow, February 26, 1921.
G. Chic her in L* Karakhan 
Kochave rol̂ Memalek
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TRI-PARTITS TREATY OF ALLIANCE
His Ira parlai Majesty the Shah in shah of iPan. on the 
one hand̂  and His Majesty the KlnK of Great Britain. Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas. Emperor of Indlâ  and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist jRgouhlica on the other;
Havlnp; in view the principles of the Atlantic Charter 
jointly agreed upon and announced to the world by the President of the United Stated of America and the Prime 
Minister of the United Elngdoa on 14 August 1941, end en­dorsed by the Government of the làilon of Soviet Sovlallat 
Repûbllcs on? 24 September 1941, with which His Imperial Majesty the Shahlnahah declares His complete agreement and from which He wishes to benefit on an equal baSia with the other nations of the world̂  and
Belnr. anxious to strengthen the bonds of friendship and 
mutual understanding between them, and
Considering that these bbjects will best be achieved 
by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance*
Have ^creed to conclude a treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries;
For His Imperial Majesty the Shahlnahah of Irani 
His Excellency All Sohelly,
Minister of Foreign Affairs;
"For His Ma je Et y the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Î orthem Ireland, 
Sir Reader William Bullard, KCMG, CIE,
His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary In Iran»
For the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics;
His Excellency Andrei Andfeyevlch Smlmov,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Iran,
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Who having comaunioated their full powers, found in 
good and due form, have agreed as followss
ARTICLE I
His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as the Allied Powers) jointly and severally undertake to respect the territorial integrity, the sove­reignty and political independence of Iran,
ARTICLE II
An Alliance la established between Jis Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran on the one hand, and the Allied 
Powers on the other*
ARTICLE III
(1) The Allied Powers jointly and severally undertake to 
defend Iran by all means at their command from all aggression on the part of Germany or any other Power.(2) His Imperial l̂ajesty the Shahinshah undertakes:
a) Tp co-operate with the Allied Powers with all the means at his command and in every way possible in order that they may be able to fulfil the above under- taking. The assistance of the Iranian forces shall, however, be limited to the maintenance of internal security on Iranian territory,b) To secure to the Allied Powers for the passage of troops or supplies fvota one Allied Power to the other, 
or for other similar purposes, the unrestricted rifehtto use, maintain, guard, and in case of military necessity, 
control in any way that they may require, all the means 
of conriiunlcation throughout Irê , including railways, roads, fivers, aerodromes, ports, pipelines and tele­
phones, telegraph and wireless installations*c) To furnish all possible assistance and facilities 
in obtaining material and recruiting labour for the purpose of the maintenance and the improvement of the 
means of communications referred to in paragraph b).
d) To establish and maintain in collaboration with.the 
Allied Powers such measures of censorship control as 
they may require for all the means of communication 
referred to in paragraph b),
(3) It is clearly understood that in the application of paragraphs (2) b), c) and d) of the present article, the 
Allied Powers will give full consideration to the essential 
needs of Iran.
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ARTICLE 17
(1) The Allied Powers may maintain in Iranian territory 
land* sea and air forces in such numlDer as they consider necessary# The location of such forces shall be decided in agreement with the Iranian Government so long as the strategic situation allows* All questions Gcmceming the relation, between the forces of the Allied Powers and the Iranian 
authorities shall be settled, so far as possible, in co­operation with the Iranian authorities in such a way as
to safeguard the security of the said forces*
It is understood that the presence of these forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the 
country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations*
(2) A separate agreement or agreements shall be concluded 
as-soon as possible after the entry into force of the pre­sent Treaty regarding any financial obligations to be borne by the Allied Powers under the provisions of the present 
article and of paragpsfhe (2) b), o) and d) of article 3 
above, in such matters .of local purchases,-the hiring of 
buildings and plant, the employment of labour, transport charges, etc, A special agreement shall be concluded between the Allied Governmenta and ĥe Imperial Iranian Government defining the conditions of any transfers to the Imperial Iranian Government after, the war of buildings and 
other improvement effected by the Allied Powers on Iranian territory. These agreements shall also settle the immunities to be enjoyed by the Allied forces in Iran.
article y
The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostil­ities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her Associates have been suspended ;by the conclusion of an armistice or 
armistices, or on |t&e conclusion of, peace between them, whichever date is the earlier#
The expreeaioh "Associates* of Germany means all other 
Powers which have engaged or may in 1 future engage in hostil­
ities against either of the Allied.iowefa.
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a r t ic l e  V I
(1) The Allied Powers undertake In their relations with 
forelEh eountrlea not to adopt an attitude which la pre­judicial to the territorial integritŷ  the sovereignty or 
the political independence of Iran, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty*
They undertake to consult the Government of His Imperial 
Majesty the Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct Interests of Iran.
(2) His Imperil Majesty the Shahinshah undertakes not to adopt in his relations with foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the Alliance, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty.
article VII
The.̂ 11 led-lowers jointly undertake to use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian people against the privations and difficulties arising as a result of the present war. On the entry into force of the present Treaty, discussions shall be opened between the GoV-* ernment of Iran and the Governments of the Allied Powers as to the best possible methods of carrying out the above 
undertaking.
ARTICLE VIII
The provisions of the present Treaty are equally binding 
as bilateral obligations between His Imperial î̂ajeaty the Shahinshah and each of the two other High Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE IX
The present Treaty shall come into force on signature, 
and eĥ JLl remain in force until the date fixed for the withdrawal of the forces of the Allied Powers from Iranian territory in accordance with article V.
In witness whereof, the above-named Plenipotentiaries have sighed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done at Tehran in triplicate in Persian, English and 
Russian, all being equally authentic, on the twenty nlntî» 
day of January one thousand nine hundred and forty two.
(signed) A, Sohelly 
R. Bullard Andrei A. Smirnov
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TIÎS THRER-POfER DECLARATION CONCERHim
IMÏÏ
ISSUED al ISE TEHRAN CONFERENCE 
1 DECEIVE 194?
The President of the United States cf America^ the 
Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and 
the Prime Minister of the United Kinedom, having consulted 
with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire 
to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments 
regarding their relations with Iran,
The Governments of the United States, the USSR and the 
United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given 
in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, 
particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies 
from overseas to the Soviet Union*
The three Governments realize that war has causedi'spe6ial 
economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that 
they will continue to make available to the Government 
of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having 
regard to the heavy demanda made upon them by their world­
wide military operations end to the world-wide shortage of 
transport, raw materiela, and supplies for clvlllsn consumption*
With respect to the post-war period, the Governments 
of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are 
in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic 
problems confronting Iran at the oloae of host Hit lea 
should receive full conaideration, along with those of 
other Members of the United Nations, by conferences or 
international agencies held or created to deal with inter­
national economic matters.
The Governments of the l&iited States, the USSR and the 
United Kingdom are at one with the Government oof Iran In 
their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sover­
eignty and territorial integrity of Iran, They count upon 
the participation of Iran, together with all other peace- 
loving nations. In the establishment of international peace, 
security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with 
the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four 
Governments have subscribed*
(signed) Winston Churchill 
J.V. Stalin 
Franklin D* Roosevelt
